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Abstract 
Technology has contributed greatly to our environmental problems, but also has a key role to 
play in solving those problems. While proper financing is an enabler for development, lack of 
financing is an important constraint. Innovations reach the so-called valley of death after 
demonstration of a commercially viable product - when capital demands are high but there is 
a low ability to obtain funding. Understanding investors’ perspectives in this space enables 
more effective legislation to incentivize investment, addresses the disconnect between 
investor and innovator, and provides a framework for other investors who wish to engage. 
This research develops a grounded theory to describe the perceived risks and drivers of early 
stage venture capital investors. Theory was developed through a combination of literature 
review and semi-structured interviews. The findings reveal the complexity of the topic and 
that perspectives vary between investors. Common drivers include financial return and 
solving important issues. Quality entrepreneurs, policy, and defensibility can be either drivers 
or risks depending on the circumstances. Other perceived risks are technology risk, market 
risk, incumbent actors and capital intensity. Further research can serve to confirm and build 
upon these results.  
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1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter lays the foundation on which this report is built. It is broken into 6 
sections. The chapter provides background and context in section 1, before stating the 
empirical problem in section 2. The aim and research questions are stated in section 3, and 
the limitations of the study are described in section 4 to explain what will be excluded from 
this paper. Section 5 explains how the knowledge created from this research contributes to 
the world. The chapter ends with a general overview of the remainder of the report.  
1.1 Background 
A transition to a sustainable economy is becoming increasingly urgent (IPCC, 2014). The 
anthropogenically enhanced greenhouse effect is causing and will continue to cause 
disruptions in the climate for decades, or even centuries, bringing with it many adverse 
effects including higher temperatures, severe weather patterns, sea level rise, and disruption 
to the ecological systems (Cook et al. 2016; NASA, 2019). Within the context of this 
scientific consensus, the global population is expected to hit 9 billion by 2050, putting higher 
demand and stress on finite resources (UN, 2017). As the problems continue to worsen, we 
come closer to the point where effects on even the global scale are irreversible (Steffen et al. 
2015). The UN warns that at the current rate, there are approximately 11 years remaining to 
prevent irreparable damage to the climate and avert a catastrophe (UN, 2019b). A sustainable 
transition is imperative for mitigating and adapting to the effects.  
Fagerberg (2017) affirms that innovation must play an important role in the transition 
towards a sustainable society. Schumpeter (1942) considers innovation as “a process of 
industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within.” Put 
simply, innovation is “a new way of doing things” (Porter, 1990). The kind of innovation 
needed in a sustainable transition is eco-innovation. The EU commission (2019a) defines 
eco-innovation as  
“any innovation that makes progress towards the goal of sustainable 
development by reducing impacts on the environment, increasing resilience to 
environmental pressures or using natural resources more efficiently and 
responsibly” 
Eco-innovation is regarded not only as a catalyst for a sustainable transition, but also as a key 
element of EU policy for sustainable development (Sarkar, 2013). Eco-innovation is in fact 
vital for delivering strategic climate objectives (EU Commission, 2019b). 
Modern technology has been a large contributor to our environmental problems; however, it 
also has a key role to play in solving those problems (Berkhout, 2002). A critical element of 
achieving a sustainable transition is the development and diffusion of clean technologies 
(IPCC 2014). If we consider Ehrlich & Holdren’s (1971) equation known as IPAT, we can 
describe in simple terms humanity’s effect on the environment: 
I (Impact) = P (Population) * A (Affluence) * T (Technology) 
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Each of these three factors influence the overall impact on the environment, but they also 
influence each other. Advancements in Technology can reduce Affluence, thus compacting 
its influence on overall Impact (Chertow, 2000). Notably, Ehrlich and Holdren convey with 
conviction that ignoring any one of these will not comprehensively address impact (Chertow, 
2000). With this in mind, green technologies, or green-tech (also known as clean-tech), is the 
focus of this paper.  
The urgent need to drastically reduce burdens on the environment implies that adaptation 
within existing technologies is not enough (Rennings, 2000). Changing a technology as a 
whole, or changing the system in which it operates, has a far greater potential for sustainable 
development. (Mulder, Ferrer & Van Lente, 2011). For instance, energy storage has potential 
disrupt the energy market by acting as an enabling technology for renewables; carbon capture 
and storage is a technology that could provide significant aid in achieving Paris Climate 
Agreement goals; water desalination technologies increase the accessibility and abundance of 
fresh water (Evans, Evans & Strezov, 2012; UNFCCC, 2015; Miller, 2003). Radical 
innovations produce the market disruption necessary to displace the mainstream product 
(Christensen, 1997).  
While green technology innovation (GTI) is recognized as an important aspect for 
transitioning to a sustainable economy, financing this innovation is an important constraint 
(Hall, 2010; Schumpeter, 1934). In his theory of innovation, Schumpeter (1939) describes 
financing as an “essential element of the economic process,” a process which would 
otherwise be “logically incomplete.” Proper investment can significantly catalyze 
development and market diffusion of new technologies (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). A lack of 
this investment can be limiting, or even devastating for any innovation. As such, proper 
financing is central to the success of any innovation process (Fagerberg, Mowery & Nelson, 
2006).  
In January of 2016, the UN set 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) to guide policy and 
funding. These goals are listed in Appendix A. Within the SDGs lies vast investment 
potential within trillions of dollars (UN, 2019a). However, a significant financing gap 
remains. In the EU alone, an annual 180 billion Euro investment gap needs to be closed in 
order to achieve 2030 goals within the Paris Climate Agreement (EU Commission, 2019b). 
Naturally, a significant amount of public funding is already going toward these goals; 
however, the scale of the investment challenge is too large for the public sector to handle 
alone (ibid). Affirmed by the UN (2018), the public sources of funding in all countries, both 
rich and poor, “clearly do not suﬃce to fund the SDGs”. Private finance plays an important 
role in contributing to SDGs, and is an essential component of the financing of the 2030 
Agenda (UN, 2018). 
This paper aims to further develop the understanding of investors decision making when 
investing in green-tech innovation. From an impact perspective, there is an important link 
between private investment and impact as it helps to speed up scaling and uptake of these 
technologies. From an investment perspective, it shows potential for opportunity; Di Serio & 
Silva (2016) consider sustainability to be a coming transition on a scale comparable to the 
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industrial revolution. This paper aims to further develop the understanding of investors 
decision making when investing in green-tech innovation.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
There are numerous challenges associated with bringing an innovation to the market, 
including research and funding to ensure function, quality, cost, efficiency, and other aspects 
that ensure the ability to survive market competition (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge is to cross the Valley of Death (VOD), the middle phase 
of the innovation chain where a successful prototype tries to successfully penetrate the 
market (ibid). The challenge exists in an urgent need for funding, but a low ability to raise 
funding (Murphy & Edwards, 2003). This is due, in part, to an information gap between 
investor and innovator (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). Ventures often fail because of the 
gaps between what ventures are offering to investors and what the investors are looking for 
(Murphy & Edwards, 2003). This failure to understand one another represents a major market 
failure. 
In addition to these obstacles, policy and regulation have both a direct and an indirect 
influence on the ability of these technologies to succeed (Burer & Wustenhagen, 2009). The 
International Energy Agency highlights the need for effective policy in incentivizing 
investment, as well as the shortfall in current policy effectiveness (IEA, 2017). Other research 
shows that there is not a lack of capital investment available for these technologies, but rather 
a lack of appropriate policy measures to attract it (Masini & Menichetti, 2012; Leete, Xu, & 
Wheeler, 2013). Policy makers need to understand how investors behave and how they make 
decisions, in order to pass more effective legislation (Burer & Wustenhagen, 2009).  
1.3 Aim and Research Questions 
This project aims to contribute to the academic discourse to develop an understanding of the 
decision making of investors. It focuses specifically on venture capital (VC) investors. It 
examines both what makes these investors eager to invest in green tech innovation, and what 
makes these investors wary to invest. The project is framed to examine the investor 
perceptions. This is because of the strong link between perception and decision making; 
decisions are based on perceptions of reality, rather than objective reality. This paper 
explores the perceptions of these investors when it comes to the investment risks and 
opportunities in early stage green tech innovation. This leads to the following research 
questions:  
1) What are the perceived drivers for investment into early stage green-tech
innovation?
2) What are investor’s perceived risks in early stage green-tech innovation?
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1.4 Delimitations 
This paper focuses on private venture capital investors. This is because of the degree of 
involvement by venture capital in early stage businesses and startups. Other sources or forms 
of financing are not considered; sources of debt such as bonds or loans, government grants, 
programs, and other sources of public funding are excluded, along with retained earnings, or 
other mechanisms used by a firm. VC Investors must also be involved to at least a significant 
extent in green technology innovation. This research is focusing on perceptions, the actual 
risks of investment that are not perceived by investors, although considered, are not 
admissible in this report. Research is generalizable only to private venture capital investors 
involved in green tech innovation when considering its conclusions.   
It is important to specify what this report considers to be “green-tech innovation”. Definitions 
for this term tend to vary from person to person. In this paper, the definition is derived from 
the EU definition of eco-innovation. Green-tech innovation is therefore defined as: any 
technology innovation that makes progress toward the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
by reducing impacts on the environment or by increasing resilience to environmental 
pressures directly or indirectly. As an added constraint, incremental improvements will not be 
considered to be green-tech innovation. These do not create the necessary market disruption. 
Furthermore, improvements in efficiency are excluded. The Jevons Paradox, more commonly 
known as The Rebound Effect, implies that efficiency improvements boost consumption, thus 
adding further to resource depletion (Freeman, 2018) Innovations that change a technology as 
a whole, or that change the systems in which they operate, will qualify. 
Important to note is the difference between invention and innovation. Shumpeter (1934) 
affirms in his Theory of Innovation that “as long as they are not carried out in practice, 
inventions are economically irrelevant”. The gap between invention and innovation is of 
interest in this paper. This project focuses on only particular steps in the innovation chain, 
specifically where a successful prototype attempts to enter the market. This is the space after 
research and development, but before commercialization. Innovations approaching or within 
what is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death” are highlighted in this report.  
1.5 Contributions 
By understanding investors’ perceptions of risk and opportunity in early stage green-tech 
innovation, we can develop an understanding of their point of view when making decisions. 
This knowledge helps in several ways. It will allow innovators and entrepreneurs to better 
understand investors when they try and seek funding. It also gives policy makers tools to 
create stronger legislation and policy instruments to incentivize more investment into green-
tech innovation. This will help to nurture more investment, and more innovations through to 
commercialization. Thirdly, this knowledge can act as a framework for other investors that 
are not involved in green-tech innovation, but want to engage.  
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1.6 Report Structure 
The report is structured as shown in Figure 1 below. This chapter has introduced the topic 
and described the aim of this report. Chapter 2 describes the research methodology and the 
methods for collecting and analyzing data. Chapter 3 investigates what is already known 
about this topic, and describes the theories and frameworks used in the report. Primary data 
used in this report is made available in Chapter 4, along with initial analysis. Chapter 5 
discusses and analyzes in greater detail what the primary data shows, appropriates investor 
views, and compares and contrasts primary data with the pre-existing knowledge presented in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 6 draws conclusions based on the analysis of the data.  
Figure 1.  Report Structure 
Introduciton Method
Theories, 
Frameworks, & 
Existing 
Knowledge
Primary Data & 
Analysis
Further Analysis 
& Discussion
Conclusions
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2 Methods 
This section provides the research strategy and method used in this project. This gives the 
research a transparency that enables scrutiny over the project. This chapter also provides an 
evaluation of the quality of this research, and the extent to which it is valid and generalizable. 
Section 1 describes the overall methodology on which the research strategy is based. Section 
2 describes how data was collected for the study while section 3 describes the analysis of that 
data. Section 4 describes the steps taken to minimize research error. Section 5 describes the 
reliability and validity of the conclusions drawn from the study. Finally, section 6 states the 
ethical consideration of the study and the steps taken to address concerns. 
2.1 Research Methodology 
This report is a qualitative study. The research will analyze words and semantics as opposed 
to numerical data in quantitative research. This research will use an interpretivist and 
constructionist approach. Interpretivism is an epistemological approach stipulating that there 
are differences between people, and a strategy must be used that respects the subjectivity of 
perception, action and meaning (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  Constructionism is an ontological 
position that considers social phenomena and their meanings are continually being 
accomplished by social actors, and that social phenomena are not only produced through 
social interaction but are constantly in revision (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Constructivism 
assumes reality is constantly being constructed through each individual’s interpretations. This 
implies a high level of subjectivity on behalf of all individuals involved in the study, 
including the researcher. This highlights the importance and the role of the researcher’s 
thinking both in the collection and analysis of data.  
This research will use a grounded theory approach. Grounded theory guides the researcher to 
develop a theoretical framework that explains the studied process (Charmaz, 2001). With this 
approach, a researcher collects data and analyzes it simultaneously from the initial phase of 
research to study the social and psychological process of the sample participants (ibid). The 
logic of the grounded theory method calls for the emerging analysis to direct data gathering, 
in a self-correcting, analytic, expanding process; early leads shape later data collection (ibid). 
The study will result in a mid-range theory based on the evidence that answers the research 
questions. 
By nature, grounded theory uses inductive reasoning. As opposed to deductive reasoning, 
inductive reasoning starts with a question and collects data relevant to the question; the data 
is analyzed for patterns and themes that result in generalizations and a descriptive theory 
(O’Leary, 2007). Although the research questions remained consistent throughout the 
research process, the aim was slightly updated in order to make the aim narrower and thus 
better align the aim with the data and results.  
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2.2 Data Collection 
This thesis will collect both primary and secondary data. The collection of this data will be 
conducted with a planned-systematic approach, as according to Alvesson (2003).  To begin, 
secondary data was collected in the form of a literature review. This process was desk-based 
research primarily through internet databases like Google Scholar, among others. Scholarly 
articles and peer reviewed research were focal points, as well as information from reliable 
sources such as the UN. This shows what is already known about the area of study. It also 
provides a basis for comparison to green-tech investment where sustainability is not 
necessarily a factor. As the first step in the data collection process, the literature review acts 
as a starting point for the development of a grounded theory. It acts as data to help answer the 
research questions, and it will help to develop questions for interviews in the primary data 
collection phase. The literature review process is key because it provides a basis comparison 
for primary data, and can support or refute aspect or themes derived from primary data with 
triangulation. Literature review is therefore an invaluable step within this research. The data 
collected through literature review is provided in section 3.2 under Pre-Existing Knowledge. 
Primary data collection begins in this research after the literature review process. The primary 
data process involved a series of semi-structured qualitative interviews. The unit of analysis 
in this process is the investor. Semi-structured interviews consist of an interview guide, along 
with probing questions and/or prompts that allow discussion of interesting topics that arise. 
The interview guide is not strictly followed in each interview. Rather, the interviews 
embraced a natural flow of conversation with the investor, allowing for more topics to be 
addressed. This flexibility is one of the benefits of this form of research. The guide served to 
ensure that a particular range of topics was covered in each interview.   
Interview guide questions were drafted with the intention to uncover information relevant to 
the research question. These questions were drafted with the literature review in mind. That 
is, the literature review had an influence on the creation of interview questions. This allows 
the interview to delve deeper into the interviewees knowledge of interesting topics already 
discovered. The interview guide is available in Appendix B. Before each interview, 
respondents were made familiar with the aim and purpose of the research. This allows them 
to be more prepared for the discussion. The interviews consisted mainly of open-ended 
questions, thus allowing for responses that might not have been anticipated. With open ended 
questions, interviewees are not forced into preconceived notions of the researcher, and the 
respondent’s understanding of the topics can be ascertained (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Ambiguous terms, double leading questions were avoided in the interview guide in an 
attempt to control for bad questions. It is not possible to fully control for this in a semi-
structured interview because questions asked on the spot are impulsive and not subject to 
scrutiny.   
All interviews were audio recorded, and then later transcribed. This is beneficial because it 
creates a perfect record of what was said. Notes taken on-site cannot capture the full scope or 
depth of what was said during an interview. Furthermore, memory is a somewhat unreliable 
source psychologically speaking, as memory is subject to loss and distortion. Audio 
recordings and transcription are also superior strategies because they allow repeated 
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examinations of responses, and therefore offer for a more thorough analysis of what people 
say (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Thus, more information can be mined and discussed in the 
report.  
This study uses Purposive Sampling to select interviewees. This sampling approach 
references the goals of the research when making a sample, and therefore, interviewees were 
selected in terms of criteria that will allow the research questions to be answered (Bryman & 
Bell, 2015). It would not make sense to interview someone who is not involved in sustainable 
financing about their decision making. The sample consists of investors in relevant firms. The 
firms that are listed in the sample are the firms that agreed to be included in the study. More 
firms were contacted, but not all were willing and/or able to contribute. A list of the firms 
included in this study is available in Chapter 5.  
2.3 Analysis 
Data will be analyzed with content analysis, which Holsti (1969) defines as a “technique for 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics.” 
The analysis seeks to uncover latent content. This goes beyond the semantic content of the 
data and starts to identify underlying ideas, conceptualizations and ideologies that shape the 
semantic content (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Altheide (1996) emphasizes the role of the 
investigator, or researcher, in the construction of meaning of and in texts. In other words, the 
researcher determines what is meaningful and what is not - subjectivity is unavoidable. This 
researcher bias is a necessary source of error in this research.  
The meaningful content in the literature review is included at the end of Chapter 3, and was 
determined by the researcher as such. Content analysis is applicable in semi-structured 
interviews. It allows results to be analyzed in a systematic and repeatable way. As per 
grounded theory, analysis is continuously conducted throughout the research process. Content 
analysis was conducted through a process of transcription, re-reading of transcriptions, 
coding, and a thematic analysis.  
Resulting transcriptions from semi-structured interviews was first read casually without 
taking any notes or making any efforts for interpretations. The text was re-read, along with 
note taking and an effort to recognize significant observations. After an initial analysis, a 
coding schedule and coding manual was drafted and applied to the transcribed text. The 
coding schedule, as shown in Table 3, is the form into which data from interview text was 
entered. The coding manual, shown in Table 4, specifies the rules by which the text was 
analyzed, and what categories are used to classify the text. The coding manual and schedule 
were drafted several times throughout the research process: once after each interview, only 
being finalized when applied to all interviews at the end. The coding system was drafted with 
the intent to extract meaningful information from the data through codes. Thus, the coding 
manual and schedule only include dimensions and categories that are relevant to the data as 
determined by the researcher. The codes reflect the researcher’s interest and perspectives just 
as much as they reflect what information lies within the data (Charmaz, 2001). That is, the 
codes may not show everything within the data, but will only show what the researcher 
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decides to look for. The coding schedule and manual were designed with the research 
questions in mind; they are intended to uncover information that will help answer the 
research questions.  
Resulting coded data will then be analyzed through thematic analysis. This is a method for 
identifying patterns and themes within data (Evans, 2018). Themes capture important aspects 
of the data in relation to the research question and represent patterns within the data sets 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is popular as an analytic method because it is 
independent from any particular theoretical approach or epistemology persuasion, and is 
useful for researchers within constructionist approaches (ibid). 
Coded data and related data was gathered into candidate themes for further analysis. These 
themes will be discussed and supported with more detailed information from the interviews. 
The threshold for a theme, the pattern’s frequency of appearance in the data, is very 
subjective. It will be up to the researcher to determine what subjects will qualify as themes; 
this once again highlights the subjectivity of this research. Themes will then be reviewed and 
discussed in more detail. Themes in the primary data will be compared with pre-existing 
knowledge in the literature review. 
Because analysis is integrated into data collection, as per grounded theory, conclusions were 
constantly being developed throughout the entire research process. The resulting conclusions 
represent a mid-range theory that generalize to venture capital investors in green tech 
innovation. Because the phenomenon being described is so complex, and because the 
population being described is so large, conclusions are forced to contain fewer details. This 
enables the conclusions to be better abstracted to the greater population. 
2.4 Research Issues 
It is impossible to review all of the literature on any given topic. To suggest this would be 
absurd, especially given the 20-week time constraint. There is simply too much volume out 
there to read it all. So, there will be a significant amount of relevant literature not included in 
the review. It is thus assumed that some aspects of what is already known about the topic may 
be missed and therefore not included in the report. This possible absence of information 
could have an influence the conclusions.  
All of the data collection and analysis was done by the same researcher. However, there is an 
element of inter-interview variability in this study. Semi-structured interviews are meant to 
allow for a flow of conversation which results in a variety of responses. Furthermore, 
interviewees varied in the enthusiasm for participation as well as in their availability. Some 
investors were more sensitive in regards to time, resulting in some interviews being rushed or 
even cut short. In contrast, interviews that were able to fully play out were more thoroughly 
developed.   
There is an unavoidable human factor in this research. The boundaries and pitfalls human 
psychology apply to the researcher, as it does all researchers. Limits such as bounded 
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rationality, and obstacles like confirmation bias and anchoring bias influence this research. 
Confirmation and anchoring bias are especially applicable to this research, where a theory is 
consistently under development and initial findings influence the perception of later findings. 
These cognitive boundaries could lead to distortions or partially complete results.  This is not 
to say that the conclusions are invalid, but that cognitive factors put constraints and influence 
on the logic that resulted in those conclusions. Furthermore, it is impossible to be completely 
free of bias. Researcher bias will be an unavoidable source of research error. However, this is 
an inherent assumption of constructionism, and is embraced as a part of this research.    
This paper has given a definition of green-tech innovation in Chapter 1. This definition is not 
the same for everyone. However, what some investors consider to be green-tech might not 
qualify under this paper’s definition. This could mean that some perspectives may not fully 
apply. However, all investors observed in the sample had technologies in their portfolio that 
do qualify, making all perspectives relevant and valid.  
Even when the observations themselves are of high quality, the sample is small. The sample 
size for grounded theory needs to be large enough to reach what Corbin & Strauss (1998) 
describe as theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation occurs when no new or relevant data 
seem to emerge, categories are well developed in terms of properties and dimensions, and the 
relationships among categories are “well established and validated” (Corbin & Strauss, 
1998). Research should continue until new observations show no new data. If grounded 
theory does not meet the requirements for theoretical saturation, conclusions are at risk of 
drawing conclusions with low validity or reliability (Thomson, 2010). This threshold of 
theoretical saturation is not a threshold that this study is able to meet. Due to limited 
resources and time constraints, primary observations (interviews) were limited to investors 
accessible by the researcher within the time limit who were also willing to contribute. This 
resulted in a small sample. Because the topic is so complex, it would take far more interviews 
until no new relevant data could be found. Accordingly, theoretical saturation is simply 
beyond the capabilities if this research. It is reasonable and acknowledged that this research 
could be ignorant to relevant topics. Thus, the findings are not capable of being exhaustive. 
Also, because of the limited sample size, the conclusions risk of having low external validity 
when describing all investors in GTI. 
2.5 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability considers the extent to which a study’s results are consistent over time, are 
representative of a population, and repeatable with similar methodology (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). Reliability is more of a concern in quantitative research than in qualitative research, 
and measuring reliability in qualitative method is difficult (ibid). This study is not repeatable 
in its exact form because of the high level of difficulty associated with getting interviews 
with these investors. The process can be repeated as it has been described, but because of the 
freedom granted to the researcher in analysis, researcher biases and heuristics constitute a 
form of error.  
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Validity considers the integrity of conclusions drawn from research, and weather the research 
measures what it is supposed to measure (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The remainder of this 
section discusses various relevant aspects of validity and how they apply to this research.  
Ecological validity concerns weather findings within a study apply in the real world (Bryman 
& Bell, 2015). In the context of this study, ecological validity questions whether the 
perceptions that investors express in interviews are the same as their perceptions when 
considering real life investments. This difference is difficult to measure. For research 
purposes, this paper assumes that there is no difference between reported and actual views. 
Internal validity considers the degree to which observations match the theoretical ideas 
developed by the study. LeCompte and Goetz (1982) considered internal validity to be a 
strength in qualitative research. The conclusions derived from this study are applicable within 
the context of the study itself.  
External validity, on the other hand, refers to the degree to which findings can be generalized 
outside of the context of the study. (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This is a particular problem for 
this research because of the small sample that was used, and the sample was not able to reach 
theoretical saturation. It is the nature of qualitative method to generate depth rather than 
breadth, and findings tend to be situated to the context of the study (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
This is true in this study as well. Perspectives of each investor are examined with great detail 
in this report. Guba & Lincoln (1994) argue that this provides others the ability to make 
judgements on the generalizability of the findings. Furthermore, as constructionism considers 
each individual to have their own construct of reality, there are always going be exceptions to 
the rule.  
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
The questions asked in this research are not designed to extract “sensitive information”. 
However, privacy is an important and valid issue which can be concerning to investors. Any 
individual who contributes to the study remains anonymous. However, the organization are 
included in a description of the sample. The reason for this is to give legitimacy to the data. 
Any information obtained in interviews is not be directly linked to any organization. Rather, 
patterns between interviews are discussed. When quotations are used, they are quoted as “an 
investor” as opposed to the individual’s name, or the organization to which they belong. All 
interviewed investors were provided with informed consent, allowing for an audio recording 
and presentation of analyzed data as described. All primary data was handled in accordance 
with GDPR. 
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3 Theoretical Perspectives, Conceptual 
Frameworks & Existing Knowledge 
This chapter is broken into two major sections. The first section provides the theories and 
frameworks used in this paper. The second section lays out the pre-existing knowledge 
surrounding the topic gathered through literature review. This chapter serves as a starting 
point in the development towards a grounded theory.  
3.1 Theoretical Perspectives and Conceptual Frameworks 
This section lays out the theoretical perspectives and conceptual frameworks used in this 
research. It is broken into five sub sections. Each sub section will describe the theory or 
framework in detail in its relation to this research. The Valley of Death, and the Stages of 
Technology Maturity help to understand the context and the problems being addressed. 
Perception and decision making establishes the link between the two. The Impact Investment 
Framework for Decision Making helps to understand investors perspectives when evaluating 
particular kinds of investment. Behavioral Finance explains the impact of psychology on 
financial decisions. All are relevant and meaningful in the context of this research, and all are 
described in detail below. 
3.1.1 Valleys of Death 
The Valley of Death, as described by Auerswald & Branscomb (2003) the space within the 
innovation chain which is most challenging to cross. After a commercial concept is verified, 
demands for cash flows are intensified. At the same time, access to this essential cash flow is 
very poor. Because of this, many innovations or startups fail. The valley of death extends 
until penetration of the target market. A product’s potential for success is irrelevant in the 
VOD. The product needs ample investment from private sources. VOD is illustrated in figure 
2 below; the dotted line representing VOD and the blue line representing cash flow.  
Part of the cause for VOD is a disconnect between investors and innovators. The two have 
different knowledge, goals, experience, and expectations. Inventors are familiar with science, 
and the technological feasibility and novelty of their invention. In contrast, investors have an 
understanding of bringing a technology to market and the financing behind it. This is a clash 
between technology push and market pull. The ability or inability for investors and 
entrepreneurs to understand each other influences the success of crossing VOD.   
3.1.2 Stages of Technology Maturity 
Foxon et al. (2005) develops a dynamic framework for technology maturity. In this model, a 
technology moves through several stages of maturity over time. It moves through Research 
and Development to Demonstration, followed by Pre-Commercial and Supported 
Commercial, and ends at the Fully Commercial stage. This does not imply a linear flow, as 
information moves in both directions; technology pushes from early stages and market pulls 
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through commercial demand. Technologies make progress toward technical and commercial 
maturity through the “systemic interaction of a complex network of actors” (Foxon, et al. 
2005). Sometimes, these systems break down and a technology will fail to reach maturity (not 
least of these, VOD).  
With each stage, the technology gains varied amounts of market penetration. Market 
penetration follows a pattern similar to a sigmoid curve. After the demonstration phase, 
market penetration rises exponentially. After supported commercial, penetration reaches the 
inflection point. A technology reaches the highest market penetration in the fully commercial 
phase, where the money is made. Market penetration is represented in figure 2 below, along 
with VOD. The phases of technology maturity are not named in figure 2 according to Foxton 
et al. (2005). Rather, figure 2 illustrates the relationship between market penetration and 
VOD; when enough market penetration is reached, the product becomes economically self-
sustaining. 
Figure 2. The Valley of Death in the Innovation Chain 
3.1.3 Impact Investment Framework for Decision Making 
Johnson & Lee’s (2013) framework defines impact investment as investments made to 
generate a market-based solution to a social or environmental challenge. Impact investing 
goes beyond traditional approaches of maximizing returns and minimizing risks. It also 
considers the social/environmental effect that an investment has. It is a strategy chosen by 
investors specifically because of its ability to generate social and/or environmental returns. 
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This framework is not specific to innovation, or any type of investment for that matter (debt, 
equity, stocks, etc.).  
Impact investing is very investor specific. While there are so many challenges that an 
investor may choose from, it is important to remember that the challenge needs to be 
something that the investor wants to address; it is the investor’s intent that matters. Social 
return objectives can vary from person to person; it is up to each investor to decide how much 
impact they want their investments to have toward their goal. The same can be said about 
financial objectives. Some investors might be content accepting below market rate returns as 
long as they are satisfied with the social impacts. Others strive for or even expect their 
investments to generate market rate returns.  
3.1.4 Perception and Decision Making 
Robbins & Judge (2013) give a good explanation of perception and its relationship with 
decision making, which is key to this study. Perception is a process by which individuals 
organize and interpret their impressions in order to give meaning to their environment. 
However, our perceptions can be different from objective reality. The perception of reality is 
what decisions are based on, not reality itself.  
Factors that shape or distort perception of reality include the perceiver, the object or target, 
and the context or situation. The perceiver’s interpretation is heavily influenced by their 
personal characteristics, such as their attitudes, personality, expectations and experiences. 
The characteristics of the target influence what is perceived. Because we don’t look at targets 
in isolation, the relationship between the target relative to the context influences perception.  
Every decision requires us to interpret and evaluate information. The data considered relevant 
to a decision is determined by perceptions. Perceptual distortions can often lead to bias 
conclusions. However, it is these perceptions that determine decisions, not reality itself.  
3.1.5 Behavioral Finance 
Behavioral finance incorporates psychological and emotional factors in its attempt to explain 
the reasoning of investors (Ricciardi & Simon, 2000). After all, investment decisions are 
made by humans. The main focus of behavioral finance is on the limitations of cognitive 
ability of investors and the role of emotions and social psychology (Bergset, 2015). Rather 
than some objective aspects of risk and return, a behavioral perspective would suggest that 
perceptions matter, and that perceptions of risk and return are influenced by cognitive factors 
(Wustenhagen & Menichetti, 2012). Several of these limitations and biases are discussed in 
this section.  
Investment decisions are made by humans that act under bounded rationality (Simon, 1955). 
Bounded rationality is often cited as a constraint for decision making. Humans have limited 
information-processing capability, leading to uncertainty (Robins & Judge, 2013). This is 
related to prospect theory, which states that people do not always behave rationally, but 
psychological biases influence choice under uncertainty (Ricciardi & Simon, 2000). People 
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rely on a set of heuristics when making judgements under uncertainty, and this can lead to 
systematic errors in decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Other common biases in decision making include optimism bias, anchoring bias, 
confirmation bias, and risk aversion. With optimism bias, or overconfidence bias, we tend to 
overestimate our own skills and predictions for success (Ricciardi & Simon, 2000). 
Anchoring bias refers to our tendency to overvalue and fixate on initial information without 
properly adjusting our opinions and perceptions with subsequent information (Robinson & 
Judge, 2013). This has relation to confirmation bias, our tendency to seek information that 
confirms our past choices or beliefs and discount contradictory information (Robinson & 
Judge, 2013). Humans also have a tendency to be risk averse; people tend to avoid risk and 
select an outcome with more certainty (Robins & Judge, 2013). Kahneman & Tversky (1979) 
demonstrated that losses are weighted differently form gains, and expected gains/losses better 
explain investor behavior compared to final assets. 
These biases and limitations are descriptions of human psychology and behavior, not of 
financial behavior. Behavioral finance uses these psychological factors to help describe the 
actions within a financial setting.  
3.2 Existing Knowledge 
This section includes data and information from the desk-based literature review portion of 
data collection. It shows secondary data, and things that are already known about the research 
area. It is focused on the perceived drivers and risks in an effort to address the research 
questions. Included in the review are articles of similar nature to this research, perspectives of 
venture capital and private equity in general, and other relevant information. Each section 
states and explains a driver or risk. The final section summarizes the literature review.  
3.2.1 Technological Risk 
Technology risk refers to whether a technology will achieve its expected performance, 
efficiency and/or cost reductions (Foxon et al. 2005). In other words, it is the risk that the 
technology will not actually do what it is supposed to, and is one of the major risks in 
technology innovation. Confidence in the capability of a technology is fundamental to 
investment decision of investors (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013). Investors want to see a 
credible track record of good performance over time (ibid).  
Technology risk also relates to lock-in and path dependency from previous development and 
investment (Polzin, 2016) Developers (and investors) can be tied into sub-optimal designs 
due to previous decisions and investments (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013). This can result in 
large losses for investors.  
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3.2.2 Market Risk 
A green-tech innovation is worthless unless it is able to survive in the market. Market risk 
refers to the uncertainty of the innovation’s ability to succeed in the market, and uncertainty 
about future levels of reward (Foxon et al. 2005). An inability to comprehend signals from 
the market such as demand or biases for incumbents or alternatives hinder diffusion of 
technologies into the market (Polzin, 2017). Investors prioritize market criteria, such as 
expected demand – a major obstacle when it is lacking (ibid) It is also a common flaw of 
investors, however, to fail to understand the target market for the technologies (Udwin, 2015) 
Start-ups that are able to recognize that an entire market is not exactly up-for-grabs, but 
instead target niche markets, might have a better chance of success (ibid).  
Local and environmental acceptance is imperative; negative attitudes or social values about a 
technology can hinder diffusion technologies (Polzin, 2016). This is of course only the case 
when there is rejection from the market. If investors perceive a high risk of social acceptance, 
it can result in early rejection of investment for a technology (Hu et al. 2018).   
3.2.3 Incumbent Technology 
Investors recognize that incumbent firms provide an important barrier to a young firms 
success (Bocken, 2015). In order to succeed, an innovations business model needs to 
significantly outperform the incumbent industry (31% of interviewees) (Bocken, 2015). 
However, economic barriers make this challenging. Economic lock-in and path-dependence 
due to a history of investments in old technologies can put incumbents at a large advantage 
(Negro, Alkemade & Hekkert, 2012). For example, fossil-fuel energy dominates the market 
with the help of decades worth of investment, and an economy built around its use. Investors 
are often involved in financing both new entrants and established actors, and are thus prone to 
lock-in because the incumbent technologies provide stable return (Bocken, 2015).  
Investment into Green-tech innovation, such as renewables, can suffer further. disadvantages 
due to environmental externalities (Wustenhagen & Menichetti, 2012). When negative 
environmental effects of incumbents are not incorporated into costs, a fossil-fuel based 
technology benefits from the absence of these costs (Polzin, 2017). Furthermore, artificially 
low energy prices due to subsidies for fossil-fuels can spoil the energy (and cost) savings that 
many clean technologies depend on (Polzin, 2016). This indirectly puts green-tech at a 
disadvantage. Green-tech can in fact suffer a double blow from externalities as the positive 
externalities created are not sufficiently reflected in prices (Bergset, 2015).  
3.2.4  Policy and Regulation 
There is strong evidence in the literature that government policy and regulation have a strong 
influence on eco-innovation, and green-tech innovation (Faucheux & Nicolai, 1998). 
Regulation and policy are likely the most direct forms of risk for an investment, as many 
technologies are directly or indirectly dependent on these policies to be in their favor (Polzin, 
2016). Proper legislation is paramount in impeding or enabling investment in green-tech. 
Investors are unlikely to invest in riskier technologies without effective policy support 
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(Arrow, 1962). It is important to keep in mind the complex dynamic between policy and 
investment flow; sometimes even the most ambitious policy targets are unable to mobilize the 
proper investments (Masini & Menichetti, 2012).  
There is a debate as to whether innovations have been driven by a technological push or by 
demand factors (market pull), while evidence shows relevance for both (Rennings, 2000). 
The way regulations are written can influence this dynamic. Those advocating for market 
push policies articulate the need for technological breakthrough innovation (Burer & 
Wustenhagen, 2009). The rationale behind market-pull policies is that new technologies only 
make an impact if they are applied in a marketplace, and that a higher demand provides 
economic incentives to apply them (Dowlatabadi, 1998). Some investors believe that there 
should be a mix of both technology-push and market-pull instruments to stimulate investment 
along the entire innovation chain (Burer & Wustenhagen, 2009).  
However, factors of technology push and market pull alone do not seem to be strong enough, 
green-tech and other sustainable innovations need specific regulatory support (Rennings, 
2000). Feed-in-Tariffs is a particular mechanism highlighted in the literature. It is a more 
effective policy scheme in comparison to market-based approaches in reducing investment 
risk (Butler & Neuhoff, 2008). Feed-In-Tariffs have been shown to be highly effective in 
achieving deployment targets (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013), and are favored by both 
investors and entrepreneurial firms (Toke & Lauber, 2007).  
Massini & Menichetti (2012) quote Ecofys (2008) in saying “commitment, stability, 
reliability and predictability are all elements that increase confidence of market actors, reduce 
regulatory risks, and hence significantly reduce the cost of capital”. Clarity, consistency and 
predictability of the regulatory environment are all critical factors for investors (Leete, Xu & 
Wheeler, 2013; Burer & Wustenhagen, 2009). The more frequently regulations change, the 
more risk investors assume. Where the regulatory risk associated with policy changes is 
perceived to be high, investors will be less willing to factor the support mechanisms into their 
calculations (Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009). It is imperative that investors have confidence 
in the long-term stability of support mechanisms (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013).  
3.2.5 Capital Requirements 
Given the nature of other risk factors, high capital requirements factor in as an important 
element in investment decisions (Gaddy et al. 2017; Flotow, Polzin & Klerkx, 2016). High 
costs for deployment is also mentioned by scholars as a barrier (Polzin, 2017). This acts as a 
barrier when firms do not have the necessary capital to execute an investment. However, 
there are some arguments that capital intensity is not a barrier. As referenced in Udwin 
(2015), after the 2008 crisis, “capital became incredibly scarce for anything perceived as 
having even the least bit of risk”. This would explain the lack of investment into more risky 
ventures during the last decade.  
It is not just the scale of the investments, but the associated uncertainty and unpredictability 
that accompanies it (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013). High levels of capital acts as an amplifier 
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of risk; if the probability of associated investment risks remains constant, the stakes are raised 
when capital requirements are high.  
3.2.6 Entrepreneurial Knowledge and Skills 
The knowledge and skills of the entrepreneur of business is of high importance to investors; 
things like leadership potential, industry experience, track record are taken into account 
(Burer & Wustenhagen, 2009). These skills reflect the firm’s ability to be successful. This is 
the case with start-ups of any kind, and often ads an element of risk. Taking a technology 
from the lab to the market involves many challenges requires a wide variety of skills from 
developers; it is unlikely that any one entrepreneur or business will have all of these 
necessary skills (Leete, XU & Wheeler 2013).  
Entrepreneurs in green start-ups can be knowledgeable in environmental issues associated 
with their business, but also lack proper business qualification (Bergset, 2015). This can be 
perceived as a lack of needed skills by investors. Green start-ups consider sustainability-
related information central to the market in which they operate, even if the investor does not 
(Bergset, 2015). Bad business plans in which there is too much focus on environmental issues 
and not enough on financial planning creates a disincentive for investment (ibid). 
Furthermore, innovators tend to have an optimism bias in the performance, time frames, and 
development costs (Leete, Xu & Wheeler, 2013).  
3.2.7 Insufficient Returns 
Naturally, if a project is unable to generate the necessary return, it is considered an 
investment risk. Causes for insufficient return in green-tech innovation are linked to the other 
risks discussed in this section. Additionally, green-tech and other environmentally focused 
businesses may be subject to a misconception that sustainability is an added cost (Huhtala, 
2003). While this is not the case, as shown by Khan, Sefarim & Yoon (2016) in section 3.2.9 
along with other researchers, it is an important point because it is still a perspective held by 
some investors.  
Innovation and start-ups are high risk investments due to the fact that the majority of them 
fail. The higher level of risk associated with these investments leads to higher rates of 
required returns (Ciccozzi, Checkenya & Rodriguez, 2003). Investors such as VCs that 
specialize in innovations and start-ups expect successful investments to have pay-backs high 
enough to compensate for investments in failed companies (Gaddy et al. 2017). This puts the 
start-ups under high stress to generate acceptable high levels of return.  
3.2.8 Investment Timeframe 
One of the obstacles discussed extensively in literature is a long payback period (Polzin, 
2017). Sustainable businesses are typically developed within longer timeframes; however, a 
short-term mindset is prevalent among many investors (Bocken, 2015). A project’s 
timeframe, planning and duration are closely linked to budgeting, risk management and cash 
flows associated with investments in innovation (Scarpellini, Valero-Gill, & Portillo-
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Tarragona 2016). Most investments are generally illiquid until there is an exit, usually 
through acquisition or IPO (Gaddy et. al., 2017). Thus, time to ROI is a significant 
consideration for any investor in start-ups (Udwin, 2015). A tolerance for a longer time-frame 
is needed for investments in sustainable entrepreneurship (Bergset, 2015) 
3.2.9 Returns and Impact 
Investors committed to sustainability usually believe that there is a dimension of 
accountability; they feel responsible for the well-being of future generations (Antarciuc et al. 
2018). There is also a sense that business can be used as a force for sustainability, and be 
good for business (Bocken, 2015). Ethics and virtue are a factor, as there is a desire to solve 
society’s major issues. They search for radical new approaches due to a disagreement with 
the status quo (ibid).  
One of the major drivers for investment is a competitive advantage (Burer & Wustenhagen, 
2009). Innovation can lead to the creation of new products and markets, resulting in new 
demand and vast opportunity (Antarciuc et al. 2018).  New markets result in what Kim and 
Mauborgne (2005) describe as “blue oceans”. As opposed to competing for market share in 
the existing “red sea” market, disruptive innovations create whole new markets where no 
competitors exist.  
Contrary to the common misconception that sustainability is a cost, scholars suggest that 
there is a positive relationship between environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
involvement and financial performance (Dowell, Hart & Yeung, 2000). In particular, firms 
that perform strongly on material topics outperform firms who perform poorly on material 
topics (Khan, Serafeim & Yoon, 2016). This is evidence that investment into material issues 
as being value enhancing (ibid). Performance on immaterial topics was shown to be at the 
very least not value destroying (ibid). This makes it imperative to distinguish between 
material and immaterial issues. It is more than often the case that ESG is material to green-
tech. The misconception noted in section (insufficient returns) that environmentally focused 
businesses suffer lower returns is not the perspective of all investors. In fact, according to 
Connaker and Madsbjerg (2019), more than $11.6 trillion USD were invested into ESG 
investment strategies.   
3.2.10 Impact Measurement 
Impact measurement is needed to understand the ‘additionality’ of an investment, whether the 
impact was a result of the investment, or if it would have occurred anyway (EU Commission, 
2016). Impact investors often want to know about the performance of their investments in 
terms of social impact just as much as they want to know about the financial performance. 
Generating meaningful and understandable performance indicators can help entrepreneurs to 
generate quality reports, measure improvements over time, and attract new funding (Keyte & 
Ridout, 2016).  
However, this measurement comes with a lot of associated challenges. As found in a study of 
investors in Silicon Valley, there is a lack of clarity and an inconsistency in the measurement 
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of impact investment success, creating more confusion for social entrepreneurs when seeking 
funding, finding traction, and balancing profit and impact (Rustique & Winter-Hoelzl, 2017). 
Measurable performance indicators are not always the most important things to investors as 
they are not always meaningful measurements. While impact measurement is undeniably a 
challenge, it is something investors get excited to see. The ability to measure impact with 
meaningful performance indicators is a driver for investment. “the better we get at measuring 
impact, the more money will flow into impact investment” (EU Commission, 2016).  
3.2.11 Summary 
Table 1 below summarizes the major drivers and risks discussed in this section. It 
summarizes the drivers and risks described in this section as well as those that are both 
drivers and risks depending on the situation. This initial analysis aids in the development in a 
mid-range theory to describe perspectives of VC GTI. This is used in a comparison with the 
primary data to strengthen the findings. 
Table 1.  Literature Review Summary 
Drivers Risks Situation Dependent 
Financial Return Technology Risk Policy 
Solving Societal Issues Market Risk Entrepreneurial Talent 
Impact Measurement Capital Requirements 
Timeframe 
Insufficient Return 
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4 Primary Data & Analysis 
This chapter discusses the data from the primary sources of this research, and the initial 
coding analysis of that data. The primary data sample, who was interviewed in the study, is 
presented and discussed in section 1. The coding template used to analyze the transcribed 
interviews is presented and described in section 2. This section provides clarity in how the 
data was analyzed and reduces ambiguity. The interview transcriptions themselves will not be 
provided. The resulting coded data is provided in section 3.  
4.1 Sample 
The sample size of this study is quite small, with only four observations. This is largely due 
to the fact that interviews were so difficult to come by. Investors of this variety that meet a 
good standard are difficult to find. Even more difficult is getting your foot in the door. 
Investors were often either unable or unwilling to contribute, thus resulting in a small sample 
size. This is taken both a benefit and a burden. It is a burden because it is difficult to have 
statistically significant results with such a small sample; four investors are not able to fully 
represent all investors in GTI. This is not enough to reach the threshold of theoretical 
saturation that strongly supports a grounded theory. Thus, the external validity or 
generalizability of the results suffer. The small sample is also benefit because it allows for 
more detailed analysis to unpack what investors say in the interviews, and generate results 
that are more thorough. 
Perhaps more notable about the sample is the list of observations themselves. The strength of 
this sample might not lie in the quantity of observations; rather, the strength lies in the quality 
of the observations. Each investor was successful, experienced, and involved, to various 
degrees, within GTI. Not every technology in every company’s portfolio qualifies under the 
definition of GTI given in Chapter 1. Some investors operate in other spaces in addition to 
GTI. Every company’s portfolio had at least some technologies that do qualify under that that 
definition. Some GTI’s within the collective portfolio include electric airplanes, power grid 
optimization, heat-generated electricity, grid connected smart homes, bioplastics, bio fuels, 
sub-surface pumped hydro energy storage, ocean wave energy, and many more 
The investors showed great insight relevant to the research aim and research questions, as 
well as demonstrated depth in understanding of the complex subject. The perspectives of each 
and every investor are valid, reliable, and highly valuable in regards to this research. While 
the investors themselves are not included in the sample in respect for privacy, the 
organizations in which they are involved are provided in alphabetical order in Table 1 below. 
The reason for this is to legitimize the sample’s strength. The unit of observation is the 
investor, not the firm!  
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Table 2. Sampled Organizations with Descriptions 
4.2 Coding Manual and Schedule 
The following tables, Table 2 and Table 3, show the coding schedule and coding manual 
respectively. These were used in the coding of each interview. They went through a drafting 
process throughout initial coding, and the final coded interviews are based on these tables. 
The coding schedule shows the dimensions of information mean to describe each 
interviewee, and the manual provides the guide to how each interviewee can fit into each 
dimension. Each category is associated with the code at the top of the manual, and that code, 
if it applies, is placed into its respective dimension in the schedule. In general, categories and 
dimensions were added if it applied to the data in some way. Dimensions within the coding 
schedule and categories within the coding manual that do not result in any meaningful 
information are removed or excluded. It is possible to have more than one code for a 
dimension. The dimensions and their associated codes are described in the remaining text of 
this section. The description of the coding scheme is provided to account for ambiguity, to 
ensure agreement on the terms that are used, as well as to better clarify the analysis of the 
data. The order of the dimensions or the codes in the tables has no important meaning.  
Organization Location Type Description
Almi Invest Green-Tech Fund Stockholm, Sweden VC
Seeks ventures that, through a product or service, 
result  in CO2 reduction either directly or indirectly. 
650 Million SEK of captial under management. 
City Light Capital New York, NY, USA VC
Aims to solve today's most pressing issues through 
the implementation of technology. The goals is to 
generate market rate returns and create social 
impact in the process. The firm focuses on safety 
and care, education and environemtnal companies in 
several sectors. 
Clean Energy Venture Group
New York, NY, USA      
Cambridge, MA, USA
VC / Angel
Seeks to invest in technologies that will result in 100 
million tons of CO2 reduction per year. 100 Million 
USD of capital under management. 
One World Training and 
Investment
Silicon Valley, CA, USA VC
Provides training and education to people who work 
in the social impact ecosystem as well as manages a 
fund which makes early stage investments into for 
profit socail enterprises. 800K USD of captial 
invested. 
Sampled Organizations and Descriptions
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Table 3. Coding Schedule 
Dimension 1 describes the professional position held by the investor within their respective 
organization. Only titles that apply to the sample are included as possible codes. It is possible 
to have more than one if it applies to that investor. Dimension 2 places each investor on the 
impact investor scale. As discussed in section 3.1.3, an investor can be impact focused when 
the goal of investment is to generate as much impact as possible even if it means sacrificing 
return, or an investor can be return focused where the goal of investment is to generate (at 
least) a market rate of return, even if it means reduced impact. As it is a scale, an investor can 
fall anywhere in between. Investors can fall between 1 and 5, 1 being impact focused, and 5 
being return focused. 
Dimension 3 describes which investment stage the investors are involved in. Seed and Pre-
Seed Capital refer to the earliest stages of investment. Capital in these stages are meant to get 
the venture off the ground, Seed Capital being the first official stage for equity funding 
(Reiff, 2019). Series A further develops and optimizes a business after key performance 
indicators develop a track record (ibid). Series B funding builds and expands and scales the 
well-established business (ibid). Series C funding focuses on scaling an already quite 
successful company (ibid). Pre-Public Stage is quite self-explanatory in that it is the stage 
before the company goes public (ibid).  
Dimension 4, Investment Criteria, describes what qualities a technology or entrepreneur 
should have in order for the investor to seriously consider it. If an entrepreneur does not meet 
one or more of the criteria it will severely diminish investor confidence. Possible codes for 
Dimension 4 evaluate whether the firm has high quality entrepreneurs, (code #1), if they have 
the ability to scale (code #2), if they have a proven commercial potential, usually through 
Dimension Code
1 -
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 -
6 -
7 -
8 -
9 -
10 -
11 -Desired Policies
Percieved Drivers
Percieved Risks
Percieved Barriers
Ideal Entrepreneurs
Coding Schedule
Investor Information
Professional Title
Investment Stage
Impact Investor Classification
Optimal Time Frame
Optimal Market Conditions
Investment Criteria
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market research or initial sales (code #3), And if the company has a potential to generate high 
ROI (code #4). Code #5 considers whether the venture will solve the issues that are important 
to the investment firm. Many firms will target specific issues. A venture may provide a good 
solution to a societal issue, but if the firm is not involved in that issues, it will not be 
considered for funding. Code 6, evaluates whether ventures meet the performance screen of 
the investment firm, such as avoiding a minimum volume of carbon emissions. Code 7 
evaluates any proof of initial business success; more than one investor only considers 
ventures that have at least 1 million USD in past revenue. Code 8 evaluates the measurability 
of the resulting impacts of the venture on society. 
Dimension 5 describes the perceived barriers to investment. Capital Intensity is a barrier 
when the capital requirements for a venture are too large for a firm to handle. This is more 
likely the case when the firm is small. Incumbents act also as a barrier because, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, past investment, current market position, and an incumbent’s ability to adjust 
can put new entrants at a severe disadvantage. Policy is a barrier when laws or regulations 
prohibit or limit a key aspect of a business/technology. Lack of entrepreneurial knowledge is 
a barrier because humans are boundedly rational. It is likely that there is at least some 
important knowledge missing that hinders the firm’s ability to succeed. The ability to 
measure impacts refers to a firm’s ability to measure and report performance data relevant to 
the issue or issues they are trying to solve.  
Dimension 6 involves risks that occur after investment has been made. Among the investment 
risks considered are technology and market risk as described in Chapter 3; there is a risk of a 
lock-in or a technology not achieving expected performance, and there is a risk of failure in 
the market. Policy risk (code #3) considers when policy changes against, and when pre-
existing policy has larger negative effects. Entrepreneurial Shortfalls (code #4) involves the 
inabilities of the entrepreneurs to handle the unpredictability of the start-up journey. 
Insufficient Returns (code #5) refers to the occasions when a venture does not achieve the 
necessary rate of return required by the investor. Long Investment Time Frame (Code#6) is a 
risk because a venture may have a longer pay-back-period than initially thought. Capital 
Intensity is a risk for two reasons: an investment may require additional funding down the 
road, which may exceed a firm’s limitations, and/or capital intensity can act as a risk 
amplifier. When more capital is invested, the probability of risk does not necessarily increase, 
but the severity of the risk increases. Product Defensibility (code #7) refers to a firm’s ability 
to protect its technology or platform from being mimicked by other firms. This can be 
reduced through patents and trade secrets. Myopic risk (code #8) refers to an investors 
ignorance of what is beyond their view; that is, it is the risk that an investor assumes when 
they focus too much attention on what is directly in front of them. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. Downstream Investor Support (code #9) refers to the ability for a 
firm to obtain funding in future investment rounds. Fast Pace is a risk as well because of the 
speed at which change occurs. Windows of opportunity are becoming increasingly shorter.  
Dimensions 5 and 6 are related in that they both represent the perceptions of things that 
negatively affect a potential venture. Barriers must be overcome for an investment to 
succeed, and thus the prevalence of barriers influences the investment risk; barriers are a 
form of risk. Risks, on the other hand, are not necessarily barriers.  
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Dimension 7 describes the investors perceived drivers. Code #1, Strong Financial Return, 
refers to the desire to invest because the investment will generate a strong financial return to 
the investor. That is a competitive, at least market rate return. Risk Reduction (Code #2) is a 
reduced investment risk associated with investment in this space. Code #3 refers to an 
investor’s desire to invest because it will solve important issues important to them and/or 
society. Industry Macro Tailwinds (Code #4) refers to trends in the market or operating 
context of a business that help it to improve or succeed more easily or more rapidly. Note that 
this is in reference to the large scale. Policy and Regulation in Code #6 can be a driver as a 
venture can take advantage of existing policies to work in their favor. Code #7 represents an 
investor’s drive to invest due to the quality of the entrepreneur or entrepreneurs involved in a 
venture.  
Dimension 8 describes an investor’s perception of the ideal market they would want for their 
venture to target. The first four codes are self-explanatory: large, small, new and old markets. 
Code #5 represents a market that is in transition. Code #6 is related to the Macro Tailwinds 
mentioned in Dimension 7, when overall market trends work in favor of the venture. The last 
Code 7 represents a market or industry that is struggling and in turmoil.  
Dimension 9 describes the entrepreneurs that an investor would consider to be ideal, and 
what qualities are desired in the entrepreneurs they invest in. This helps to determine what 
entrepreneurs might fit into Dimension 7 to be considered a driver for investment. Code #1 
evaluates the entrepreneur’s knowledge and skills within the context of their business; is this 
a journey they have done before? Code #2 considers the team of entrepreneurs. How well do 
they work together? How long have they worked together? Do they understand one another 
and do they have the same goals? Code #3 evaluates their understanding of their target 
market. How do they expect their product/service to be received, and do they understand the 
consumers? The Investor-Entrepreneurial Fit (Code #4) refers to the match between the 
investors and the investment firm and the entrepreneurs in terms of their goals, but also in 
their ability to work together and help each other. This is discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 5. Lastly code in Dimension 9, Code #5, considers the CEO of the venture. It 
evaluates their ability to understand the business they are building, what skills are needed, 
their leadership abilities, and whether their talents suited for the business and industry.  
Dimension 10 determines each investor’s optimal time frame. That is, how long the pay-
back-period for investment. Rather than having specific codes, the number in dimension 10 
will represent the number of years an investor considers desirable for a pay-back-period.  
Dimension 11 describes what kinds of policies or regulations an investor does not see (at the 
time of this report), but wishes to see put in place. Cap and Trade and a Price for CO2 are 
coded as #1 and #2 respectively. Code #3 considers the desire for worldwide policy – having 
a policy in just one country is not enough. Code #4 represents the desire for municipal 
governments to become more involved and more risk taking in this space in order to help 
along the small players. Code #5 represents the desire for subsidies.  
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Table 4. Coding Manual 
4.3 Coded Data 
Table 4 below show the coded data of each interview, based on the schedule and manual 
provided in section 4.2 above. The interviews are represented as interview A, B, C, and D. 
The interviews are placed into the table in no particular order. They are put into the same 
table simply because having a different table for each interview would be redundant. This 
coded data is useful for identifying the patterns. However, it does not do the data total justice 
because if fails to capture the important nuance and variance within the data. This nuance is 
discussed in Chapter 5, along with a deeper discussion of the trends and themes. The 
remainder of this section discusses the contents of the table and the patterns within. 
Dimension One shows that all of the observed investors had a higher position, if not the 
highest position, within their organization. Two were investment managers or directors while 
two founded their organization. The table shows that every investor considered themselves to 
be a market rate return seeker on the impact investment scale; all of them are self-defined as 
return first impact investors. All investors were early stage investors in the seed rounds, some 
occasionally extending into series A or series B. What this table does not show is the degree 
of involvement in each stage. As a general rule, each investor was most focused within Seed 
Capital or Series A investments.  
Dimension Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 5 Code 6 Code 7 Code 8 Code 9 Code 10 Code 11
1
Investment 
Manager/Director
Partner CEO Founder
2
Scale: 1=Impact first 
5=return firs
3 Pre-Seed Capital Seed Capital Series A Series B Series C
Bridge or Pre-Public 
Stage
4
High Quality 
Entrepreneurs
Scalability
Proven 
Commercial 
Potential
High Return 
Potential
Solution to 
Relevant 
Issues
Meet 
Performance/Result 
Critia
Proven 
Business 
Success
Measurable 
Impacts
5 Capital intensity
Incumbent 
Technology, 
Market, or Actors
Policy
Lack of 
Entrepreneurial 
Knowledge
Ability to 
Measure 
Impacts
6 Technolgy risk Market Risk Policy
Entrepreneurial 
Shortfalls
Insufficient 
Returns
Long Investment 
Timeframe
Capital 
Intensity
Duplicability
Myopic 
Risk
Downstream 
Investment 
Support
Fast Pace
7 Strong Financial Returns Risk Reduction
Solving 
Important 
Issues
Industry Macro 
Tailwinds
Policy & 
Regulation
High Quality 
Entrepreneurs
8 Large Small New Old Transitioning Macro Tailwinds In Turmoil
9
Knowledgable, Skilled, 
and Experienced in 
Field
Experienced, 
Aligned Team
Understanding 
of Target 
Market
Investor-
Entrepreneur Fit
CEO-
Company Fit
10 (Number of Years)
11 Cap & Trade Price for CO2 Global Policy
Municipal 
Engagement
Subsidies
CODING MANUAL
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Table 5. Coded Data 
Some of the investment criteria were expressed by every entrepreneur. Of these were High 
Quality Entrepreneurs, Scalability, and Solutions to Relevant Issues. Other highly occurring 
criteria include a Proven Commercial Potential, High Return Potential, an ability to meet 
performance or result criteria, and Measurable Impacts. Of the perceived barriers, only one 
was shared by all investors: Lack of Entrepreneurial Knowledge. The highly occurring 
barriers in this table were Capital Intensity, and Policy - to a lesser degree, the incumbents.  
There are several perceived risks in the table that are shared by all investors, namely 
Technology Risk, Market Risk, Entrepreneurial Shortfalls, and Insufficient Returns. The only 
other highly occurring risks include Duplicability. Almost all of the risks were perceived by 
at least one other investor. There was a wide variety of risks expressed by the investors, 
hence the high number of categories. This is partly due to the fact that a few risks, Myopic 
Risk and Fast Pace, were only perceived by one of the investors.  
The perceived drivers are fairly consistent between the investors, and two of the investors 
shared the perception that all the drivers in the table apply to them. Of the drivers shared by 
all investors are generation of a financial return, the ability to solve important and relevant 
issues, and High-Quality Entrepreneurs. All of these are factors that make each of these 
investors want to invest their money. Other highly apparent drivers include the potential to 
generate a competitive advantage and/or an above market rate of return, and Policy and 
Regulation. Every driver was perceived by at least more than one investor.  
There are no optimal market conditions that are acknowledged by all investors; however, 
large markets seem to be an important trend. But there seems to be a general agreement in 
what an ideal entrepreneur should like. Every investor is in consensus about almost every 
factor, save one: CEO Company Fit, which was expressed by only one investor. All investors 
were in agreement about the rest of the qualities of their ideal entrepreneur. Knowledgeable, 
Skilled and Experienced Entrepreneurs, Experienced, Aligned and Competent Team, 
Dimension Codes A Codes B Codes C Codes D
1 1 2,4 1 3,4
2 5 5 5 5
3 1,2 2,3 2,3 1,2,3,4
4 1,2,3,4,5,6, 1,2,4,5,6,7,8 1,2,3,4,5,6,8 1,2,3,5,7,8
5 3,4, 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,4,5
6 1,2,4,5,8 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,11 1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9 1,2,4,5,7,8,10
7 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,3,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5,6 1,3,4,6
8 5,6,7 1,6 1 1
9 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,5
10 10 10 10 N/A
11 1,2,3 1,5 N/A N/A
Optimal Market Conditions
Ideal Entrepreneurs
Optimal Time Frame
Desired Policies
Coded Data
Investment Stage
Investment Criteria
Percieved Barriers
Percieved Risks
Percieved Drivers
Investor Information
Professional Title
Impact Investor Classification
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Understanding of Target Market, and Investor-Entrepreneurial Fit were expressed as 
important by all investors. 
There was a general consensus among the investor that the desired investment timeframe was 
10 years. Some allow for the possibility of extensions, and one investor did not consider 
timeframe important at all. Not all investors expressed a desire for policy changes, but the 
ones that did offered a range of suggestions for policy changes that would help encourage 
investment in this space. 
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5 Further Analysis & Discussion 
This chapter develops a deeper analysis discussion of the data. While chapter 4 identified the 
major trends and patterns of perceived risks and drivers in the primary data, this chapter 
analyzes the transcribed interviews to a depth that the previous chapter is unable. This 
chapter discusses the drivers and risks themselves in depth. There are many interesting 
findings and noteworthy remarks made by investors that are discussed in this chapter, which 
help to understand why investors have the views that they have. This “why” is important 
because it appropriates and substantiates their views. The important details, complexities and 
idiosyncrasies associated with investor’s views are also highlighted throughout this chapter. 
This chapter compares and contrasts the primary and secondary data. The chapter is broken 
into 4 major sections. Initial discussion in section 1 explains important notions to consider 
when analyzing the data. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the perceived drivers and risks, 
respectively. Section 4 wraps up the discussion and summarizes the chapter. All quotations in 
this chapter are direct quotes from interviewed investors unless clearly stated otherwise.  
5.1 Initial Discussion 
In this section describes all of the primary data, as well as secondary data, and brings up 
important elements to consider when trying to understand the data. It serves to better 
understand the drivers and risks discussed in latter sections of this chapter. Broken into three 
sub-sections, it discusses investor variability, a return-first investment approach, as well as 
the complexity of the data.  
5.1.1 Investor Variability 
No two investors are completely alike. Investors vary in their knowledge, goals, skills, focus, 
scope, strategies, preferences, size, the list goes on. Most importantly for this paper, investors 
vary in their perceptions. Investors have various opinions on what they consider the drivers 
and risks to be, and will perceive each of those risks and drivers with varying degrees of 
conviction. The degree to which perceptions vary varies. This depends on the individual 
investors being compared. This variance is clearly evident through the empirical observation 
of investors. This variability comes with no surprise given the complexity of the topic. 
This variability is for both objective and subjective reasons. Variance due to subjectivity 
comes from the variance in knowledge, goals, and heuristics. Because of this, two investors 
can perceive the same potential venture differently. Subjective variance comes from 
situational circumstances. The same venture may be perceived differently if it is considered 
in different contexts. To illustrate this with an example from the data, we can consider Time 
Frame. Time frame was important to three out of the four investors, to varying extents. 
However, one of the four investors did not consider time frame very important to him. That 
was his subjective opinion because he happens to have different investment goals.  
Variance in opinions can also be explained for objective reasons. Investors operate in 
different geographical regions, in different sectors, and with different settings. The 
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perceptions of risk or opportunity vary partly because they don’t always apply to the same 
extent. As an illustrative hypothetical, investors in renewable energy will have different 
perceptions of policy if they operate in a country with a price on carbon in comparison to a 
firm that operates within a country without this added cost. This goes to show that 
perceptions can vary between investors both for objective reasons and subjective reasons. 
Thus, this variability is an unavoidable source of variance that must be embraced as part of 
the result. 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the emergent patterns that appear in the data. 
Chapter 6 will arrive at conclusions that describe the sample and attempt to describe the 
larger population. Throughout this process it is imperative to keep in mind that there are 
always some elements of variability between individuals. There is not cookie-cutter, one-
size-fits-all framework that will describe all investors in this space comprehensively. While 
some perceptions are applicable to all investors, it is not implied that all aspect that is 
discussed applies to all investors, or that any aspect will always apply to the same extent. 
Given the high variability, the patterns that do emerge are more meaningful.  
5.1.2 Return-First Impact Investing 
Every investor classified themselves as a market rate seeking investor. On the spectrum of 
impact investors that was explained in section 3.1.3 everyone was on the “return first” end 
This is something that is consistent among all investors that were interviewed. This suggests 
that if a potential investment will not be able to achieve at least the market rate, then it will 
not be seriously considered by the investors. Entrepreneurs should play close attention to this 
pattern. Investors reported that they would ony consider investment if a venture had a 
potential to achieve 10X ROI. One investor conveyed with strong conviction that “we are in 
this to make money.” Another investor discussed the strangeness of the idea that suggests 
investors might be looking for below market rate returns, something that traditional investors 
would never consider.  
There are some very important reasons behind this view of a strictly market rate seeking 
investment strategy that deserve examination and discussion. Firstly, early VC involves a 
high level of risk, and it is not uncommon for a venture to fail entirely. Thus, the successful 
ventures must perform well enough to compensate for the failures. Furthermore, contrary to 
what some believe, impact investing does not need to exist below the market rate of return. 
“People hear (impact investing) as essentially concessionary investing, and there’s a strong 
belief that it is not a concession, that it is a theme.” Impact investment is often thought of as 
having tradeoffs between impact and financial return. But the impact space is perfectly 
capable of achieving market rate return if approached properly. One investor uses the term 
profitable social impact. “It’s social impact, yes, but it’s done in a way that’s synergistic to 
the business.” When profitability is directly connected to the positive impact, the tradeoff 
notion can be disregarded. This view of using a for profit business to generate social change 
is powerful, but it is far from universally accepted.  
While these investors refuse not sacrifice financial return, they still insist on having strong 
social and environmental impacts. Not sacrificing return does not imply that there is a 
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sacrifice in impact. In fact, according to these investors, it is quite the contrary. “To generate 
any impact, there has to be a very solid business behind it.” In other words, the best way to 
solve the issues is through a strong successful business. A successful business that is able to 
scale and generate high return on investment (ROI) has a greater ability to achieve the desired 
social or environmental impact. This is because of the ability of a successful business model 
to grow to larger scales.  
“A lot of people talk about, you know, impact at scale. But you know you might 
have the best intentions in the world, but unless you’re really funding robust 
businesses led by capable entrepreneurs that are going to get the business off 
the ground, then, you know, it doesn’t matter, right?”  
The view is that a business should sustain itself and grow in order to reach the scale to 
achieve greater impact. If a business is small or will not survive long, it is not going to 
generate much impact. Strong successful business is a better path to solving issues. One 
investor emphasizes his underlying philosophy.  
“We’re very passionate about the idea that making money by averting climate 
change is the best way to avert climate change. Um, and so if you’re a good 
impact investor you should be a good financial investor or you won’t have as 
much impact as you intended.”  
These investors perceive the two factors, return and impact, as correlated and linked. 
According to them, the idea that impact investing requires trade-offs between impact and 
return is outdated. Occasionally, tradeoffs may be necessary, but it should not be considered 
as the rule. You can have one without the other, return without impact, and impact without 
return. But the strongest impact is achieved hand-in-hand with strong financial return.  
5.1.3 Complex Interrelationships Between Drivers and Risks 
There is a relationship between the different barriers and risks. The categories of risk and 
opportunity influence one another. It is inappropriate to look at just one without considering 
the rest. The factors are connected through a complex web of influence. An example to 
illustrate this point: in the context of renewable energy, subsidies on fossil fuels, or a lack 
thereof, will have a large influence on the incumbent carbon-based fossil fuel industry. This 
can result in incumbent actors as being more or less of a barrier. This in turn influences the 
ability for a venture to be financially successful, its market acceptance, its market risk and 
thus the willingness for investors to engage. This is to show that if the proper policies were 
put in place, barriers to innovation and thus investment could be reduced or even eliminated. 
The contrary is also true in that policy can create larger barriers and increase investment risk. 
The interconnectivity forces all aspects to be considered when making investment decisions. 
If steps are taken to decrease one particular factor of risk, it will have an influence on the 
other elements of risk and element of opportunity. Investors need to consider all the pieces as 
parts of a larger picture, and the influence that their means of risk management has on that 
picture. Furthermore, each specific venture is going to look different. Some barriers might be 
larger, some risks might be larger. Even if a venture is incredibly effective in managing some 
forms of risk, it may not be enough for the venture to be successful. Many different factors 
come together to determine the success of any one venture. The importance lies in how the 
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drivers line up with the risks and barriers. This interrelationship is incredibly important. This 
complexity is difficult for anyone to understand, but it is what investors must recognize and 
discern when making investment decisions.  
5.2 Drivers 
This section discusses the perceived drivers that were prevalent in the data. It discusses each 
driver in detail, and examines why investors have the perceptions that they do. This section is 
broken into 6 drivers. Not all drivers are perceived by all investors, or considered to have the 
same intensity.  
5.2.1 Strong Financial Returns 
Naturally, one of the main drivers for investment is to generate a financial return. Investors 
commit to this space because they believe that there is financial value to be found. This is 
self-evident. But there was a pattern here that not as obvious: investing in this space has the 
potential to generate a stronger rate of return in comparison many alternatives.  
This is not a perspective that is held by all investors in the sample – as stated, investors vary 
on their perceptions. But for those who agree with this, consider the environmental space to 
involve a competitive advantage in comparison to the alternative. “It’s essentially contending 
that um, you know, a portfolio based on mitigating climate impact will outperform a portfolio 
that exacerbates it or does nothing,” explains one investor. This belief stems from the notion 
of momentum behind a societal shift away from un-sustainability. The opportunities are vast. 
As the investor explains, “we have more deals than we can handle.”  
There is also a shift away from where the green-tech space was in the 2000’s. During that 
time, the green-tech space was struggling. This is what many will point to when they say 
green-tech is a high-risk space. Now, there is a perception of a healthier market, as 
demonstrated by some of the investors in the sample.  
“The industry wasn’t as ready then as it is now. The pressure is much, much 
higher and the readiness is much, much higher. So um, I think there is a big 
difference now compared to (10 years ago).”  
This excitement of both investors and others contributes to the perception of an undervalued 
sector and a space that is full of competitive advantage over unsustainable alternatives. 
5.2.2 Risk Reduction 
Some of the investors choose to involve themselves in this space not just because they are 
seeking value or high ROI, but also because it involves lower investment risk. True, this is 
not a driver observed by all, but it is still important for several interviewees. The believe that 
the trends over the coming years and decades will not only reward those that move away 
from unsustainability, but punish those that do not. “Investing in things that don’t mitigate 
climate change, or do the opposite, uh, is actually a bad investment strategy” says one 
33 
investor. The general view is that things will change in a way that will make business 
operating in an unsustainable space riskier and more difficult. “It’s not saying that it wouldn’t 
be very successful, but you are then facing more risk – would be less resilient compared to if 
you would be hitting all of the sustainability goals,” explains another investor, referring to the 
effects of policy changes and increasingly constrictive environmental pressures.  
5.2.3 Solving Societal Issues 
One of the most important drivers for investor involvement in this space is a willingness to 
solve important issues within society. Every investor in the sample sighted this as a driver for 
investment. Investors are not all trying to solve the same issues; some investors are specific to 
one particular problem like CO2, others take a more horizontal approach and involve 
themselves in many environmental and social issues. However, the desire to solve important 
issues is consistent. It is an important driver for investment in GTI.  
Investors got excited when discussing their engagement in the issues through doing business. 
“The win-win for me and the double whammy is the fact that these are actually companies 
that are doing work to improve lives and improve the planet in some way.” This is something 
that investors can be very passionate about. Others brought a more business sided financial 
discussion in affirming that solving the issues, such as climate change, is good business.  
One investor was more serious about the gravity of our problems. He explained that 
environmental problems are the most important and pressing issues today. He acknowledges 
Bill Gates, and agrees with his view that “even though we get a better vaccine around the 
world that would save millions of lives, or billions, it wouldn’t be worth much if we can’t fix 
our environmental problems right now.” The view is that the environmental problems can 
become so severe that it will make solving the social issues like poverty and disease much 
less relevant. Solving the issues then becomes important not just for ethical reasons or for 
business reasons, but because it is paramount for the well-being of society.  
5.2.4 Impact Measurability 
As discussed above, investors are driven to invest in GTI in part by a willingness to solve 
important issues. Just like investors like to know what financial return is generated from 
investment, they like to know what impact is generated from their investments. In the sample, 
there was a strong pattern to show the importance of impact measurability as it was expressed 
by almost all investors to have varying degrees of importance. This means that a venture 
should be able to accurately measure the social or environmental impact that their firm has. A 
rigorous report on social impact is increasingly demanded by investors. The degree to which 
a firm can do this is an important quality that could potentially make or break a startup. 
This is more or less difficult depending on what sector a firm is in. Which indicators get 
measured is important to determine as well. For instance, a firm in renewable energy is 
capable to measure the CO2 avoided in comparison to various kinds of fossil-based energy. 
This is quantifiable and trackable. It is more difficult for the same firm to measure the 
indirect impacts on health. This deeper data is more difficult to collect and is not as easily 
quantifiable. It may be the case that a firm cannot accurately measure its impact at all. How 
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does the This will depend on the technologies themselves, the goals they are trying to 
achieve, as well as the resources that the firm itself has.  
What gets measured gets financed. There is a vast volume of reports and research out there 
dedicated to impact measurement alone. This highlights the attention dedicated to this area. 
Entrepreneurs often need to have as much transparency in their social and environmental 
impacts as they have with their finances. They should invest the necessary time and effort in 
collecting and presenting that information, when possible.  
5.2.5 High Quality Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurial talent was recognized by all observed investors as being a major factor that 
influences decision making. Some of the sampled investors regard the quality of 
entrepreneurs to be the most important factor to consider when it comes to making 
investment decisions Entrepreneurs with the right knowledge and skills was expressed as a 
major driver for investment. However, lack of entrepreneurial knowledge or skills is 
considered a risk. Thus, the quality of entrepreneurs is paramount in investment decisions. 
“It’s all about people.” Having good entrepreneurs is a factor that is given high value in most 
all types of VC. Early stage GTI is no different.  
Observed investors agreed on the importance of having quality entrepreneurs, but also 
seemed to agree on what makes a good entrepreneur. As shown in the data, entrepreneurs 
matched in Dimension 9, which in broad strokes describes an ideal entrepreneur. According 
to the sample, they should be knowledgeable, skilled, experienced in their field, and be part 
of an aligned and experienced team that works well together, and have a deep understanding 
of their target market. One investor explains the importance of the entrepreneur:  
“Someone should be able to articulate to me why whatever they’re doing is 
valuable to a real customer who will pay you for it and they will pay you 
significantly more than it costs you to deliver it…Have they bothered to figure 
out how customers really do think? What customers, you know, what scope 
matters?”  
If an entrepreneur is not able to answer these questions adequately it can lead to a lot of 
uncertainty about the success of an investment. This highlights the importance of 
entrepreneurial knowledge and skills. Strength in relevant knowledge and skills is valuable in 
the eyes of the investors. Not having these qualities can degrade the perceptions of the 
investor, and can even be considered a risk. This makes the knowledge and skills meaningful 
qualities in an entrepreneur. However, there is more to consider when evaluating an 
entrepreneur.  
Investors described in great detail the nuance involved in how they evaluate the 
entrepreneurs, and how entrepreneurial capabilities can have different effects on the ability of 
an investment to succeed. Of course, entrepreneurial talent has to span a lot of different kinds 
of skill sets since there is so much to handle in a startup. One investor describes how 
entrepreneurial talent can consider a lot of different elements dependent on stage. “Even if 
they look very good at the stage they’re at, it’s not obvious they’ll scale to the next stage.” No 
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entrepreneur can be an expert in everything, and this needs to be understood by both the 
investor and the entrepreneur.  
“If I find someone who is brilliant at X, assuming that they’re also brilliant at Y 
and Z, um you know that’s not fair. But if they’re brilliant with X and they know 
they need help with Y and Z, um you can get somewhere.”  
This investor describes his ideal entrepreneur as “both sufficiently self-confident to start 
something, and sufficiently humble to know that they’ll probably need help, which is a 
delicate balance.” It is up to the entrepreneurs need to prove they have sufficient knowledge, 
but it is up to the investor to understand where the gaps in knowledge exists and try to 
account for those gaps.  
The skills and knowledge of an entrepreneur are important, yes, but it is also necessary for 
that knowledge to fit into the context of their business. As one investor explains: 
“What’s really more relevant is it’s less about product and market. It’s more 
about CEO and company. It’s not enough for a CEO to just, hey they went to a 
great business school, their undergrad and they worked at Google, they’re 
obviously going to be a great entrepreneur. Um what really matters is what’s 
the fit between that person and their company.”  
This refers to their familiarity with their target market, their product, their ability to work 
together with a team and be a proper leader. There is a lot to consider when evaluating the 
quality of an entrepreneur. This adds another layer of complexity onto an already complex 
context for decision making. 
The early GTI space is a difficult space to be successful. Even so, one investor maintains that 
“I feel pretty good deploying capital into it because I think we’re seeing better talent creating 
better solutions.” Quality entrepreneurs is an undeniable driver for investment. Furthermore, 
low quality entrepreneurs can be considered a risk to investors, thus making the quality of an 
entrepreneur paramount to the willingness of an investor to execute on making an investment. 
5.2.6 Investor-Entrepreneur Fit 
One subject that all investors are in agreement on is the importance of an investor-
entrepreneur fit. Investor-entrepreneur fit is considered an element that determines the quality 
of an entrepreneur. This fitness is determined by multiple factors. This involves the ability for 
an investment firm to help the venture beyond just investment capital, and the alignment of 
the goals between the two entities. 
If an entrepreneur has a different set of goals, it is not a suitable venture for the investor. For 
instance, it is important to agree on the time frame of the investment. “We have a 10-year 
fund” reports one investor.  “And so, if a company is saying they have a 20-year horizon, I 
mean venture capital is not the right fit for that.” What’s also important is that the end goal is 
the same for the entrepreneur as the investor. Another interviewed investor speaks to some 
entrepreneurs’ disinterest in an exit. He explains how some entrepreneurs “want to do a 
different kind of journey as a founder and they want to keep control and they want to grow in 
a quite organic way.” VC on the other hand generally wants to do an exit within their time 
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horizon. Scalability is also important for VC for both financial reasons and impact reasons, as 
was expressed by all investors. Some entrepreneurs seek funding for something that can’t 
scale. “It’s not always understood that some ventures aren’t meant for venture capital.” This 
is to say that it may be the case that a start-up, although it may have potential for success, 
may not be suitable for venture capital to begin with, and perhaps should consider different 
forms of financing. An inability to line up on these factors, and others, can make or break an 
investment.  
What a bit more nuanced in the investor-entrepreneur fit is the ability for an investment firm 
to aid a startup or entrepreneur beyond just the value added through financial capital. 
Investments are made when “we think we have some semblance of expertise and abilities to 
helping skills of venture companies.” Part of the value added by VC firms is their ability to 
provide advice, leverage their network, and use their own skills in support. An investor 
describes how his firm can “bring to bear other resources including our network and our 
training company to help the companies go even further.” This is often part of the investment 
decision making process. One of the investors evaluates: “Do I understand their barriers to 
entry and can I lower them with financing and partnerships and whatever else they (the 
entrepreneurs) need?” Investors are then able to “pre select to some degree, do we even want 
to make this investment, and if we choose to do so how do we best support these 
entrepreneurs? What is it that they really need?” This investor-entrepreneur fit is a selective 
screen that firms can use when determining their investment portfolios.  
The alignment of goals and the ability to provide support beyond financial capital are 
important highlights within an investor-entrepreneur fit. Other factors influence the fitness 
between investor and entrepreneur as well. One investor reports a whole class of investments 
that are not suitable for the screens used by his firm. Aside from the levels of alignment 
discussed above. Other aspects that determine the level of fitness involve whether the venture 
aligns with the other criteria the investment firm has. Does the venture solve the relevant 
issues? Is it a good investment opportunity in general? Does the firm operate within the 
proper geographical context? Put simply, an entrepreneur must meet the investor criteria in 
order to be a good fit. In any case, fitness between investor and entrepreneur is an important 
part of the screening process by investors.  
5.3 Risks 
This section discusses the perceived risks that are prevalent in the data. It discusses each risk 
in detail, and examines why investors have the perceptions that they do. This section is 
broken into seven risks. Not all aspects of risk are perceived by all investors, or considered to 
have the same intensity.  
5.3.1 Capital Intensity 
Capital intensity was addressed by all sampled investors, as well as the literature review, as a 
barrier to investment. This is only a barrier when the capital required by a venture is greater 
than the volume of capital that a firm is willing or able to commit. This is usually more of a 
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factor when capital under management is low. When a firm becomes larger and larger, this 
barrier becomes smaller and smaller. 
Capital intensity is also a factor of risk after an investment is made. Capital intensity can 
become an added factor of investment risk when a venture begins to demand more 
subsequent injections of capital. This can create a supply-demand problem between the two, 
and lead to serious financial problems. Making investments with higher capital requirements 
is not always itself a risk, but instead an amplifier of risk. The probability of the investment 
failing does not necessarily go up. Rather, the losses that are realized if the investment does 
fail are exaggerated. This is only perceived to be the case by some of the sampled investors. 
5.3.2 Technological Risk 
Technology risk was acknowledged by all of the sampled investors, and was addressed in the 
literature review as a key element of risk. In this early stage GTI space, technology risk is 
quite an obvious risk. Investors discussed in more detail how they perceived the specifics of 
technology risk, which varied a bit between investors. Functionality of a technology is in the 
more obvious category of risks: “If the product stops working, we are either going to fix it 
quickly or we’re going to lose money.” Success is directly linked to the technologies ability 
to perform well and function with the expected performance standards.  
Less obvious is that the technology itself can be a risk. Indeed, it is possible to get locked into 
technologies that are less than adequate. But even when a technology performs spectacularly, 
the product can still be vulnerable to other kinds of technology risk. An interviewed investor 
explains that the best technology doesn’t always win:  
“The technology part is by no means sufficient. And sometimes actually is a 
barrier. If your technology is too advanced for the supply chain to cope with, 
then you’re significantly hindered in your ability to make a successful business 
out of it.”  
This is contending that it is possible to be locked in to a technology that performs 
spectacularly, but for whatever reason is not received as well as anticipated. The technology 
needs to be able to fit within its intended market, and it needs to survive the other challenges 
beyond just technological ones. This is where market risk and technology risk begin to 
overlap. Technology risk is a fundamental risk, present in perceptions sampled investors as 
well as in the literature review. 
5.3.3 Market Risk 
Market risk is determined by an innovation’s ability to succeed in the target market. Market 
risk is a standard form of risk that applies to most any product in any market. It is generally 
determined by the market itself, the conditions that the market is in, along with several other 
factors. All investors acknowledged in some form the existence of market risk.  
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The intensity of market risk is perceived by some investors as quite high. It is even 
considered as more significant than most other factors of risk. One investor describes his 
perception of market risk as more serious than even technology risk. 
“The demonstration that a technology can do something really neat is often not 
the hard part. The hard part is often getting into the market channel, getting it 
into the hands of customers, getting people to trust it enough that they will 
rapidly deploy it, and that’s very expensive and very risky.”  
While market risk might be an obvious form of risk, it needs to be addressed with adequate 
vigor. Like most things, navigating the market and managing market risk is easier said than 
done.  “There aren’t that many people who have built a business successfully and wanted to 
stay in this marketplace because it’s so difficult.” Like any of the elements of risk, market 
risk does not always exist to the same degree, and it is not perceived by investors to have the 
same level of intensity. Nevertheless, market risk is a crucial element in early stage GTI.  
5.3.4 Target Market Conditions 
In order to succeed, it is important to understand the target market. It is also important to 
understand which target markets and conditions are optimal for an entry and which have 
more risk. After all, the state of the target market will influence the dynamics of market risk. 
Some conditions are optimal for entry, others far more challenging. For instance, size and 
maturity of a market are important here. Target markets help to frame where the technology 
will exist in society and will largely determine its ability to succeed. 
Along with the macro tailwinds, or major trends in an industry that act to a ventures benefit, 
sampled investors tended to perceive large markets as being ideal in order to achieve success. 
This is simply because there is more volume to take advantage of. This is helpful in that can 
generate more revenue with economies of scale. As an added bonus, it will generate more 
impact as well: “if you insist on having the level of impact that we’re talking about, the 
market have to be pretty large.” Put simply, there is a common perception that with larger 
markets come larger financial and social opportunities. 
However, there can be serious obstacles when selling into a large, mature market. One 
investor discussed how large markets can be complex, and success can involve competing 
against or changing a lot of stakeholder’s business models or habits. Mature markets can be 
difficult unless you can find a way to differentiate the technology in a way that consumers 
will perceive as better or otherwise the same. In contrast with immature markets,  
“you can get into the market much more easily, um but there’s a risk to 
understand if the market’s really going to be there or how it’s going to grow or 
what the pricing’s going to look like. You’re kind of trading risks depending on 
what market you go into.”  
This trade off of risk is derived from the differences between market sizes. Each target 
market is associated with its own pros and cons, but it is up to each investor to determine how 
the pros and cons align with them, where they think the best opportunities lie.  
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Another noteworthy, yet uncommon perception in the data in terms of market conditions was 
the perception that an industry in transition or turmoil is prime for entry. When issues and 
changes exist in and industry, “there becomes anomalies and… imperfections that small 
players can utilize.” This is important in reducing barriers to entry and creating opportunity 
when trying to enter into an existing, large market. This quoted investor considers this to be 
the most important thing when considering target market conditions. 
Target market condition influences the ability for a venture to succeed. Target markets are 
not themselves a form of risk, but rather it will determine the level of market risk, and 
influence the other aspects of risk. Its influence is itself complex, adding yet another layer of 
complexity.  
5.3.5 Incumbents 
Incumbent technologies, firms, and markets was recognized as a barrier by several investors 
as well as in the literature review. This stipulates that an incumbent’s control over the 
existing market increases the barrier to entry, that incumbent benefit from high volume of 
past investment, and that infrastructure is set up in a way that benefits incumbents. The 
incumbent actors put green innovations at a disadvantage, forcing them to overcome higher 
barriers and market risk; the innovation must outperform the incumbent without these 
benefits.  
There is always an incumbent factor in early stage VC. There is always risk that incumbents, 
when they exist, will adjust to changes or simply create a barrier to entry too large to 
overcome. The environmental sector has incumbents that are particularly stubborn. In this 
space, the forces of the incumbent can be exaggerated. As a sampled investor affirms in a 
discussion of energy:  
“There are a bunch of utility companies, oil and gas businesses, that really 
don’t want this change to occur. So, there are forces of resistance that exist that 
may not occur in other market places to the same extent…. There are large 
financial incentives for the status quo to stay the same for existing players who 
basically have, you know, power companies are basically monopolies.” 
 Bringing about necessary change is incredibly difficult given the state of the economy and 
the strength of the economic forces. The reason for this stubbornness and active effort to 
conserve the existing system is because of the large benefits to the incumbent, as the investor 
explains. For these reasons, the challenges presented by the incumbent create large barriers to 
entry for many GTIs. Of course, the strength of an incumbent will vary, and they will not 
always be as prevalent as in the energy sector. Nevertheless, investors consider incumbents to 
major barrier to the success of GTI.  
However, there are some slightly conflicting views in this space. One investor describes that 
incumbents do not necessarily take the stonewalling approach to keep the status quo as 
described above. Rather than continuing on the current path, he describes how “market 
incumbents and the petrol companies are also diverging,” creating a macro tailwind in favor 
of GTI. He describes businesses within and across sectors making changes are being made to 
shift away from unsustainability. “So I think you see this across the board and this is really 
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happening…These are major shifts that are taking place.” The shift and transition by 
incumbents and in the market can in fact turn incumbents into a driver for investment in GTI. 
This is not a perspective that is shared by many, or that is common in this sample. It is, 
however, important to highlight this view. Overall the view is that incumbents represent a 
barrier in the market within the environmental sector.   
5.3.6 Time Frame 
As mentioned in the literature review, business investments in the environmental sector can 
have a longer payback period than traditional investments. The primary data shows a general 
consistency between investors that the ideal time horizon is 10 years, which is akin with 
traditional VC. The only investor that was inconsistent did not consider timeframe as 
important at all. Interviewees were fairly inconsistent, however, in their interpretation of time 
frame as an investment risk. One investor self identifies as being more patient than normal 
VC, describing how there is a need to consider things that have a more disruptive impact on 
until after 2030 and 2040; a business needs time to grow and generate a sustained impact to 
help achieve the sustainable development goals. Others consider it to be a more significant 
investment risk, weighing much more heavily into their decision making. Timeframe can be 
just as important as any other aspect of risk.  
“(a technology) might be the most important innovation that you’re going to 
run into, but it also might be a terrible investment because it might take too 
long, um, to, to happen.” 
That is to say that even when a technology has the potential to revolutionize an industry, it 
may be a waste of the investor’s time simply because the investment takes too much of just 
that: time. Thus, a GTI can be disqualified because of the financial costs associated with 
longer timeframe. Long payback periods are of course suboptimal and inconvenient, but that 
added time is also an added cost. “If it takes somebody 3 times as long, that’s just more cash 
that they’ll need to get it right.” Longer time frames can increase the capital requirements of 
an investment and thus add to the financial risk.  
There is variance on how lenient an investor is on time, and disagreement on the degree of 
risk involved with timeframe. Some allow for extensions, or even anticipate a longer time to 
maturity, while others are firm on deadlines. Generally, the timeframe to be expected from 
investors is 10 years.  
5.3.7 Myopic Risk 
Myopia is a term analogous with near-sightedness. In this report, myopic risk is not meant to 
describe a short investment time frame. Myopia within the context of this paper is explained 
by focusing only on what is directly in front of you and ignoring other important aspects 
outside of immediate view, there is a risk of making bad decisions through the ignorance of 
other important factors or important information. This can apply to a specific investment, or 
an investment firm entirely. Myopic risk was perceived to be a risk by only one investor, and 
it did not come up in a literature review.  
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In the context of one specific investment, it is possible to get caught up in the novelty and 
excitement of an innovation. Ignoring how the technology fits into the large context is the 
kind of myopia that can have consequences.  
 “Just looking at the parts that you think are interesting right then is a big 
threat in terms of making good decisions about where to invest. If you ignore 
those other phenomena you can get whipped out. So I think a big error that 
people make is they’re behaving as though there aren’t external forces or 
broader scope, uh, or that the incumbents actually aren’t making progress 
fairly rapidly.” 
He is essentially contending that investors that operate as though they wear metaphorical 
blinders run a high level of myopic risk. Ignoring the forces that act upon you outside of your 
view can have disastrous consequences. Investors need to understand how their product will 
fit into their target market, and how their consumers behave. Not doing so can lead to major 
errors. This is illustrated by an example: 
“So fuel cell people will frequently talk about having the best fuel cells, but 
most people aren’t deciding which fuel cell to buy. They’re deciding on buying 
energy, and the fuel cell never entered the conversation until much later.”  
By ignoring this aspect of consumer behavior, the investor behaves differently and does not 
take action to account for this fact. When the technology that an investor is excited about may 
for example solve a problem that is addressed by a variety of unrelated technologies, there is 
a significant level of risk. This is illustrated with an example:  
 “People make a big mistake in thinking that energy storage is going to be 
batteries, when it could be thermal storage, it could be chemical storage, it 
could even be mechanical storage or just demand response.” 
 By ignoring the other possibilities to solve issues that do not involve the technology in front 
of you, there is an important element of risk. That form of technology could potentially be 
whipped out by an alternative form of innovation. Not considering these factors is when 
myopic risk is present in investment. As candidly put, “The errors that people make are 
extreme.”  
 Myopia can also influence an entire firm and the range of technologies they consider for 
their portfolio. It is reasonable to assume that a firm might only invest within the 
geographical context in which it operates. This, in a way, can be an advantage. It can allow a 
firm to better leverage a network and understand the context in which a venture operates. It 
becomes a risk because when the focus of the firm is only within that context, it does not 
fully grasp everything that happens outside of that context. Silicon Valley is considered by 
many to be the tech hub of the world. According to one investor,  
“we don’t really recognize that the vast amount of innovation and deployment 
is happening in China and India. And so we think Tesla is what represents 
battery powered cars, and you know it’s the fifth biggest battery powered car 
company.” 
This is contending that firms are ignorant of the global picture, and thus make inaccurate 
assumptions about market trends. This aspect of myopic risk is less significant, as it suggests 
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that global trends will overcome the national markets. It would take major market trends for it 
to become a serious element of risk. 
Myopic risk plays into behavioral finance in that it highlights the shortcomings and biases of 
the human psyche as they apply to real life; bounded rationality, anchoring bias, confirmation 
bias, all at play in this form of risk. Because the limits of the psyche apply to all humans, 
some level of myopic risk is assumed no matter the case. Myopic risk by nature is not a 
perceived risk – it is the risk that is assumed by not perceiving risks to investment. Instead, it 
is an actual risk. This is a risk that any investor must assume. Myopic risk will not be 
considered in the conclusions to be a perceived risk.  
5.4 Situation Dependent Factors 
This section discusses the aspects that can be perceived as either drivers or risks depending 
on the specific situation. It discusses these factors which are prevalent in the data in detail, 
and considers why investors have these perceptions, and how they might change in different 
situations. It is broken int 3 sub sections. The perceptions of each aspect will vary on the 
investor, and also on the situation.  
5.4.1 Policy 
Policy and legislation have an important influence on the ability of GTI to succeed. Policy is 
paramount in that it is capable of both drastically hindering and highly enabling the 
development of GTI. It can act as a barrier, it can be a driver, and it can be a risk. This will 
depend on the way the legislation is set up and the effect it has on any specific technology.  
Policy barriers exist when they prohibit aspects of a technologies ability to function in the 
market, and when they enable the incumbents, for instance. Policy can be a driver for 
example through subsidies, or prices on negative externalities, which can often work in favor 
of a GTI. Even the absence of policy can influence an innovation greatly; not having a cost 
for carbon is a benefit for carbon-based fuels. The literature review discussed much policy 
and its influence. In the sample, almost all the investors considered policy to be a barrier as 
well as a driver, but also to hold its own element of risk.  
What was interesting about the interviewed investors was their ability to manage policy. In an 
effort to shelter the portfolio, investors insulate themselves from policy, tending away from 
even those that take advantage of policy benefits. “We want all of these businesses to, kind 
of, stand on their own two feet from an economic perspective” explains one investor.  “We 
typically don’t like companies that are relying on policies for their only existence or tax 
credits to make their projects economically viable. We’ve never made money doing that.” 
This investor avoids these businesses because he considers them to be a bad idea financially. 
Another investor who holds a similar strategy explains that “the business has to be rational 
without a change in policy. It has to create, you know, customer value above its cost without 
aspirational policy changes.” Staying away from these policy dependent businesses limits the 
volatility associated with policy changes, and reduces the risk that favorable policy will be 
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absent. This is not a complete aversion from policy, but rather a cautious approach to how it 
is embodied within a portfolio.  
“It’s not that we would never take subsidies or that we wouldn’t need subsidies 
for the company to succeed, but I think that there’s a pretty steep belief that you 
need subsidies that don’t exist yet, that’s a bad idea, and if you need the 
subsidies forever, that’s a bad idea.”  
It is impossible to completely insulate yourself from policy, but sheltering yourself to a 
degree is a good idea, according to these investors. Taking policy into account is important 
when evaluating investment, and the way in which policy is managed can help determine the 
success of an innovation.  
There were some investors who expressed a desire for policies that do not yet exist. The 
desired policies differed, as investors operate within different geographies, different sectors, 
and with different heuristics, as previously discussed. Some of these desired policies included 
a global carbon tax and cap and trade. The policies discussed in the literature review trended 
toward feed in tariffs. The optimal policies for GTI are going to vary based on the technology 
itself.  
5.4.2 Downstream Investor Support 
There is some concern from investors about the fate of their investments down the road. As 
presented in Chapter 5, most of the sampled investors focus on the Seed and perhaps Series A 
rounds of investment. However, firms often have a need for funding further down the road. 
One investor highlighted this in his explanation of the risks. 
 “Once companies need a series A or series B there’s probably fewer funds that 
would say ‘we are, you know, doing series A and series B’… And as an investor 
there’s not the downstream investor ecosystem that will help, uh, make sure that 
your investment continues to get funding and stay alive.”  
If a venture does not continue to get the necessary funding down the road, it will influence its 
ability to survive. This investor acknowledges the risk that this downstream support may not 
exist in all cases. This is a view that came up only once in the data in terms of perceived 
investment risks. Others have networks that can control for this risk, such as partners “who 
have very deep pockets and the ability to take care of the rest of the deployment.” A lack of 
downstream support is not a risk that was very commonly expressed, but it is an element of 
risk that is worthy of discussion.  
5.4.3 Duplicability or Defensibility 
Duplicability accounts for a technologies ability to defend itself from being replicated or 
mimicked by other firms in competition. Duplicability was recognized as a risk by a majority 
of the sampled investors. The extent to which a technology is duplicable is a combination of 
technology risk and market risk. The more duplicable a technology, the higher the risks. 
However, when a technology is protected or remarkably difficult to replicate, it can be a 
strong competitive advantage. This makes an innovation’s duplicability a point of interest, 
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something particularly important to protect. Depending on the degree to which an innovation 
is defensible, it can be regarded as either a driver or a risk.  
A common way to minimize this risk is through patents. But there are several other ways to 
protect the secrecy of an innovation. An investor describes that “defensibility, it’s not just 
about patents, it’s about trade secrets and first mover advantage.” Being the first mover into a 
market can come with a lot of rewards, such as a lack of competitors to take market share, or 
even seek to mimic the technology. Trade secrets on the other hand require a level of 
confidentiality that will reduce the transparency of the firm. Heim (2018) argues that 
“maximizing short-term extra-nominal profits resulting from sustainability innovations may 
involve reducing transparency in order to maintain exclusivity of the innovations.” 
Transparency can be important to businesses operating in the environmental sectors, and this 
might involve a tradeoff between secrecy and transparency. Trade secrets can be effective 
when appropriate, it will depend on the business and the technology itself which method of 
defense is best.  
Some innovations might be more defensible than others. In any case, the degree to which a 
product is defensible is an important quality measured by investors. It will help to determine 
its business success in the short and long term. Duplicability is considered either a risk or a 
driver, depending on the degree to which the innovation is able to be duplicated.  
5.5 Further Discussion 
This section wraps up the discussion of the findings. It is broken into two sub-sections. The 
first compares traditional venture capital investing with venture capital in green technology or 
environmental investments. The second section summarizes the major findings discussed in 
this chapter.  
5.5.1 A Comparison: Traditional VC vs. GTI VC 
Traditional Venture Capital, or VC without any particular environmental focus, in 
comparison to Green-Tech Venture Capital have some important differences, but overall, the 
two are more similar then they are different. When comparing the two, one investor explains, 
“We look at similar things as any other early VC would do, but we just add a layer of also 
that you have to have significant CO2 reducing impacts.” The argument here is that GTI is 
just an investment theme available to venture capitalists. The procedures and goals of scaling 
a business for a return on investment is the same. The differences are in the specifics of the 
firms and the sectors. Another investor compares traditional and green VC: 
 “I’m trying to bridge a gap between an interesting concept with the potential 
to do something that people want to do, and I’m trying to get my entrepreneurs 
from here to there with a combination of money and coaching and strategic 
relationships, uh, we all do the same job. But the details vary rather a lot 
depending on who are the friends, what is the market, how stable are the 
policies”  
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On the macro level, when speaking broadly, GTI and traditional Venture Capital are the 
same. They are trying to do the same thing the same way: scale a product with commercial 
potential to make high ROI. Many of the questions and criteria are the same: scalability, 
market diffusion, consumer preference, and so on. On the micro level, when analyzing more 
of the details, traditional and green VC have some big differences. GTI VC has to have 
different approaches when you look at the market and analyze the risks. The effect that the 
risks and even some drivers have is different between the two. It is these differences that 
emphasize the relevance of this research. Traditional and Green Tech VC are similar when 
painting in broad strokes, but much of the details and other features are very different.  
5.5.2 Summary of Important Findings 
Perceptions of investors can vary, in part due to the complexity of this subject.  
The important findings discussed in this section in describing the perceived risks and drivers 
are presented in Table 4 below. It shows the perceived drivers and risks that are most 
prevalent in the data, as discussed throughout this chapter. Because the research questions are 
“what” questions, the table summarizes what the perceived drivers and risks are. It does not 
show the complexity and variance of the data or the variability between the intensity of the 
risks or drivers, neither does it make clear the frequency to which these aspects are present in 
the data. In order to get a complete understanding of the results, it is best to consider this 
entire chapter and not just this summarized account.  
Table 6. Summary of Important Findings 
Drivers Risks Situation Dependent 
Financial Return Technology Risk Policy 
Solving Societal Issues Market Risk Product Defensibility 
Quality Entrepreneurs Incumbent Actors Downstream Support 
Impact Measurability Capital Intensity Entrepreneurial Skill/Talent 
Risk Reduction Long Time Frame 
As shown in the table, financial return is a main driver; the conviction for above market-rate 
returns falls into this category. The desire to find solutions for major societal issues, and the 
appetite for performance indicators and measurements of that impact are important drivers. 
High quality entrepreneurs are a driver perceived by all, with the investor-entrepreneurial fit 
influencing the quality of the entrepreneurs.  
The common perceptions of risks were technology risk, market risk, incumbent technologies 
and firms, and when it is prevalent, capital intensity. Policy, product defensibility, and the 
talents and skills of the entrepreneur will be drivers or risks depending on the situation, and 
how they apply to the technology in question. This can be a bit misleading because all of 
these factors are to a degree situation dependent in that the situation will effect the perception 
of each driver and risk, and the intensity of their influence.  
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While Table 4 summarizes the important findings, it is not recommended that this table be 
taken in isolation. The table fails to capture the data’s complexity, it does not show the varied 
levels to which the drivers and risks are acknowledged, and does not present the fascinating 
and stimulating insights of investors. In order to fully understand the perceptions shown in 
the table, it is recommended to read this chapter in its entirety.     
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6 Conclusions 
This research aimed to develop an understanding of venture capital investor decision making 
in regards to early stage green-tech innovation. It sought to do this by answering two research 
questions: what do investor perceive to be the drivers for investment in green-tech 
innovation; what do investors perceive to be the risks for investment in green tech 
innovation?  
The conclusions below were generated through a combination of literature review and semi-
structured phone interviews. This information serves to help entrepreneurs at or near the 
valley of death to understand investors and align their goals when searching for funding; it 
will help legislators to draft more effective policy to attract funding; it provides a guide for 
investors who were not previously involved with green tech innovation but wish to engage.  
The perceived drivers for investment include strong financial return, solving societal issues, 
impact measurability, risk reduction, and high-quality entrepreneurs. The perceived 
investment risks include technology risk, market risk, incumbent actors, long time frame and 
capital intensity. All of these drivers and risks will be perceived differently depending on the 
specific situation. Aspects that are particularly situation dependent include policy, 
entrepreneurial talent and skills, and product defensibility, which can be perceived as either 
drivers or risks depending on the situation. 
Investor perceptions vary. This variance is due to several factors: investors have different 
knowledge, heuristics, and goals; the target of what is being perceived varies as they operate 
in different contexts; different situations will lead to a difference in perceptions. Furthermore, 
the complex nature of the topic generates a lot of nuance. Thus, all investors do not recognize 
a common list of drivers and risks, nor do they all agree on how significant each aspect is on 
that list. While some of the perceptions mentioned above are more or less universal, the 
investor’s specific goals and specific context should be considered before making 
presumptions about all of these views. 
In order to give these findings more external validity, this study should be compared to other 
similar studies. This would serve to confirm these findings and to build on them. Future 
research can further develop the academic discourse. This research can also be compared to 
research investigating the perspectives of entrepreneurs and innovators in order to get a 
completed picture.   
Green technology innovation is an important solution to our environmental issues. Financial 
investment enables and hastens the development of these technologies. This paper contributes 
to the academic discourse within this space. Still, within the larger context of society’s 
ecological crisis, green technology innovation is but one of many solutions. Given the 
complexity, scale, and time sensitive nature of the issues, there is a need for extensive, wide-
ranging responses to those issues as well as a crucial demand for urgency. Immediate action 
is momentous. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix A – The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals 
1. No Poverty – End poverty in all its forms everywhere
2. Zero Hunger – End Hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and
promote sustainable agriculture
3. Good Health and Well-Being – Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at
all ages
4. Quality Education – Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote
lifelong learning opportunities for all
5. Gender Equality – Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6. Clean Water and Sanitation – Ensure availability and sustainable management of
water and sanitation for all
7. Affordable and Clean Energy – Ensure access to affordable reliable, sustainable and
modern energy for all
8. Decent work and Economic Growth – Promote sustained inclusive and sustainable
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
9. Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure – Build resilient infrastructure, promote
inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
10. Reduced Inequalities – Reduce inequality within and among countries
11. Sustainable Cities and Communities – Make cities and human settlements inclusive,
safe, resilient and sustainable
12. Responsible Consumption and Production – Ensure sustainable consumption and
production patterns
13. Climate Action – Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
14. Life Below Water – Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine
resources for sustainable development
15. Life on Land – Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land
degradation and halt biodiversity loss
16. Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions – Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective,
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
17. Partnerships for the Goals – Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize
the global partnership for sustainable development
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APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW GUIDE 
1. Please provide your personal background, a description of your organization and your
current role.
2. How do you approach investment risk?
3. What would you consider is “innovation”?
4. How would you define the term “sustainability”?
5. Where is the line between technology innovation and green-tech innovation?
6. Could you provide some examples of your sustainability work?
7. What do you consider to be the drivers for investment into green-tech innovation?
8. What criteria do you use when selecting green-tech firms (or innovations) to invest?
9. Are these criteria different when sustainability is not a factor?
10. Do you have a preferred investment time frame for green-tech investments?
11. What do you consider to be the barriers of bringing a green-tech innovation to
market?
12. What do you perceive to be the risks associated with green-tech innovation?
13. Are there any other topics you think we should discuss?
